Cannabis Legalization in State Legislatures: Public Health Opportunity and Risk by Orenstein, Daniel G, JD, MPH & Glantz, Stanton A, PhD
UCSF
Tobacco Control Policy Making: United States
Title
Cannabis Legalization in State Legislatures: Public Health Opportunity and Risk
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/01g4z2wd
Authors
Orenstein, Daniel G, JD, MPH
Glantz, Stanton A, PhD
Publication Date
2020
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES: 
PUBLIC HEALTH OPPORTUNITY AND RISK* 
 
Daniel G. Orenstein, JD, MPH† 
Stanton A. Glantz, PhD‡ 
 
 
This article will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Marquette Law 
Review (103 MARQ. L. REV. ___–___ (2020)). 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Cannabis is widely used in the U.S. and internationally despite its illicit 
status, but that illicit status is changing. In the U.S., 33 states and the District 
of Columbia have legalized medical cannabis, and 11 states and D.C. have 
legalized adult use cannabis. A majority of state medical cannabis laws and 
all but two state adult use laws are the result of citizen ballot initiatives, but 
state legislatures are beginning to seriously consider adult use legislation. 
From a public health perspective, cannabis legalization presents a mix of 
potential risks and benefits, but a legislative approach offers an opportunity 
to improve on existing legalization models passed using the initiative process 
that strongly favor business interests over public health. To assess whether 
state legislatures are acting on this opportunity, this article examines 
provisions of proposed adult use cannabis legalization bills active in state 
legislatures as of February 2019 to evaluate the inclusion of key public health 
best practices based on successful tobacco and alcohol control public health 
policy frameworks. Given public support for legalization, further adoption of 
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state adult use cannabis laws is likely, but legalization should not be viewed 
as a binary choice between total prohibition and laissez faire 
commercialization. The extent to which adult use cannabis laws incorporate 
or reject public health best practices will strongly affect their impact, and 
health advocates should work to influence the construction of such laws to 
prioritize public health and learn from past successes and failures in 
regulating other substances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cannabis1 is the most widely used psychoactive substance in the world 
that is under international control, with an estimated 181.8 million global 
users annually as of 2013.2 In the U.S., cannabis is by far the most commonly 
used illicit substance, with an estimated 24.0 million people age 12 or older 
reporting use in the past 30 days (8.9% of that population) as of 2016.3 Use 
 
1 The terms “cannabis” and “marijuana” (and occasionally “marihuana”) all appear in 
state law. In some states, the terms are interchangeable. See generally, e.g., Medical and 
Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act, California S.B. 94 (2017) (replacing 
statutory references to “marijuana” with “cannabis”). In others, the terms have critically 
different legal meanings. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 836 P.2d 997, 999 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1992)(refusing to apply felony murder rule in a case involving drug possession because 
possession of “cannabis,” defined under state law as extracted resin and various preparations 
thereof, was classified as a felony, but possession of “marijuana,” defined as the plant itself, 
was not). Scientifically, “Cannabis” refers to the entire plant genus, including the genetic 
variants (or possibly distinct species) Cannabis indica and Cannabis sativa. NAT’L ACADS. 
OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS 44 
(2017), available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24625/the-health-effects-of-cannabis-and-
cannabinoids-the-current-stat. “Marijuana” historically referred to the dried leaves and 
flowers of the plant, as distinguished from “hashish,” made from the resin or resin glands. 
MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 8 (Picador 2003). The word “marijuana” may derive 
from Mexican military slang for a prostitute or brothel, Maria y Juana (translating as Mary 
and Jane, and thus also the likely source for the American cannabis slang term “Mary Jane”), 
and there is a near-limitless litany of jargon and slang terms for the plant (e.g., pot, weed, 
ganja, dope, grass) owing to the need for clandestine reference to an illegal product. Id. at 
158. This article generally uses “cannabis” (rather than “marijuana”) to acknowledge the rise 
of concentrates and extracts (including their use in edibles) as a significant and growing 
product area, in addition to consideration of the historical use of “marijuana” in the U.S. as 
a pejorative with racist and xenophobic overtones, though there is by no means consensus 
on terminology. See Alex Halperin, Marijuana: Is It Time to Stop Using a Word with Racist 
Roots?, GUARDIAN (UK), January 29, 2018 (discussing racial history of the terminology); 
but cf. Angela Chen, Why It Can Be Okay to Call It 'Marijuana' Instead of 'Cannabis', 
VERGE, April 19, 2018 (arguing that “cannabis” is insufficiently specific because it is the 
name of the entire plant genus, which includes hemp, and that avoiding the term “marijuana” 
may erase the complicated and problematic racial history of criminalization of the 
substance). 
2 WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS 
USE 1 (2016), available at https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/cannabis/en/. 
3 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL 
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is highest among those 18–25 years old (20.8%).4 While overall prevalence 
is far outpaced by licit substances tobacco (63.4 million users age 12 or older; 
23.5% of population) and alcohol (136.7 million users age 12 or older; 50.7% 
of population),5 cannabis use is remarkably6 and consistently7 high given the 
drug’s illicit status.8  
 
The illicit status of cannabis, however, is in a state of flux. Despite 
continued illegality under federal law,9 between 1996 and June 2019, 33 U.S. 
states, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands legalized use of cannabis for medical purposes, and 11 
states, D.C., Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands legalized recreational 
or “adult use” of the drug.10 In these jurisdictions, a lucrative new business 
sector is rising, complete with professional marketing firms,11 industry-
specific conferences and events,12 and industry groups actively lobbying for 
favorable legal changes.13  
 
 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 14–15 (2017), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR1-2016/NSDUH-FFR1-
2016.pdf. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 11–13. 
6 Among illicit drugs, cannabis use far exceeds all others in terms of use prevalence. In 
2016, an estimated 28.6 million persons age 12 and older used illicit drug in the past month. 
Among these, 24.0 million used cannabis, while 3.3 million or fewer used any other illicit 
drug. Id. at 14. 
7 Id. at 11–15. Past-month cannabis use among all persons age 12 and older remained 
between 6.0% and 8.9% from 2002–2016. Id. at 15. While overall prevalence increased over 
this timeframe, the increase is largely attributable to an increase in use by those over age 26 
and to a lesser extent those 18–25; use among adolescents 12–17 actually decreased.  Id.  
8 In fact, cannabis use rates peaked in the 1970s, despite tightening federal control under 
the Controlled Substances Act. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1 at 62.  
9 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812  (1970). 
10 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Marijuana Deep Dive,” 2018, 
http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/marijuana-deep-dive.aspx, last 
visited June 10, 2019; Associated Press, “Guam Legalizes Recreational Use of Marijuana,” 
WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2019. The most recent adult use legalization state, Illinois, did so 
legislatively in June 2019. John O’Connor, Illinois Becomes 11th State to Allow Recreational 
Marijuana, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 25, 2019, 
https://www.apnews.com/7b793d88f3c84417b83db0f770854960. 
11 See, e.g., Ganjapreneur.com, “Marijuana Advertising Agencies: Featured Listings,”  
2019, https://www.ganjapreneur.com/marijuana-advertising-agencies/ (listing multiple 
cannabis-specific advertising agencies). 
12 Nat’l Cannabis Indus. Ass’n, “Events Calendar,” 2019, 
https://thecannabisindustry.org/ncia-events/, last visited June 10, 2019. 
13 Nat’l Cannabis Indus. Ass’n Home Page, 2019, https://thecannabisindustry.org/, last 
visited July 10, 2019.  
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Estimates for the near-term future size of the global legal cannabis market 
vary and depend heavily on assumptions of future legal changes, but some 
analysts expect the industry could grow to $75 billion in sales by 2030, 
surpassing soda, among other industries.14 The cannabis market has already 
attracted the attention and investment of major corporate entities in Canada 
(which legalized adult use in 2018), including Altria (parent company of 
Philip Morris USA, maker of Marlboro® and other cigarette labels), 
Constellation Brands (owner of Corona® and other beer labels), and Molson 
Coors (owner of Molson®, Coors®, and other beer labels), while a number 
of other large corporations, including Coca-Cola®, are reportedly also 
considering entry.15  
 
Tobacco companies in particular have contemplated entering the cannabis 
market in the event of legalization since the late 1960s.16 Public health 
advocates are justifiably concerned about such corporate entities, especially 
tobacco, entering the cannabis market, but even an independently developing 
cannabis industry poses substantial risks if it follows the path of industries 
like tobacco. As Richter and Levy explain: 
 
The tobacco industry has provided a detailed road map for 
marijuana: deny addiction potential, downplay known adverse 
health effects, create as large a market as possible as quickly as 
possible, and protect that market through lobbying, campaign 
contributions, and other advocacy efforts.17 
 
Cannabis legalization carries ostensible social benefits, including medical 
utility for some conditions18 and the promise of ending discriminatory 
enforcement practices that have disproportionately affected vulnerable 
populations, particularly communities of color, throughout the history of 
cannabis criminalization in the U.S.19 American voters have been receptive 
 
14 Jeremy Berke, Coca-Cola is Reportedly Eyeing the Legal Marijuana Industry, and It 
Could Soon Be a Bigger Market than Soda, BUS. INSIDER, Sept. 17, 2018. 
15 David Gelles, When the Makers of Marlboro and Corona Get Into Marijuana, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2018.  
16 See generally Rachel A. Barry, et al., Waiting for the Opportune Moment: The 
Tobacco Industry and Marijuana Legalization, 92 MILBANK Q. 207 (2014).  
17 Kimber P. Richter & Sharon Levy, Big Marijuana – Lessons from Big Tobacco, 371 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 401 (2014). 
18 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 13–14 (summarizing 
conclusions regarding therapeutic effects of cannabis and cannabinoids). 
19 See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 689, 690–702 (2016). Notably, there continue to be troubling disparities in 
cannabis-related arrests in adult use states, which legalization opponents cite as evidence that 
legalization is failing to achieve a key outcome advanced by advocates. Kevin S. Sabet, 
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to these arguments and have been increasingly willing to approve medical 
and adult use legalization ballot initiatives over the past two decades.20 
Particularly for adult use cannabis, ballot initiatives have been advocates’ 
legal vehicle of choice. Only Illinois (2019), Vermont (2018), the Northern 
Mariana Islands (2018), and Guam (2019), have enacted adult use laws 
legislatively; the other 9 states and D.C. have all enacted their adult use laws 
via ballot initiative.21 
 
The increasing success of legalization ballot initiatives over time22 and 
the current state of U.S. public opinion on the appropriate legal status of 
cannabis (62% support nationally for legalization as of 201823) make further 
legalization highly likely in additional states. From a legal and public health 
perspective, cannabis legalization has likely become more a question of 
“how,” rather than “if” in the U.S.24 As additional states25 contemplate adult 
use legalization, the public health implications of this policy evolution will 
depend in part on the content of legalization laws and how well they govern 
the new legal market.  
 
Marijuana and Legalization Impacts, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 84, 92–93 (2018). Among 
other factors, disparate enforcement of prohibitions remaining following legalization, 
including public consumption, youth possession, and driving under the influence, can 
contribute to continued disparities, reflecting broader inequities tied to racial profiling, 
“broken window” policing, and law enforcement saturation in neighborhoods of color. 
Bender, supra at 701–03. 
20 Daniel G. Orenstein & Stanton A. Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass: Cannabis 
Legalization Ballot Initiative Campaign Contributions and Outcomes, 2004-2016, __ J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. ___ (forthcoming 2019).  
21 O’Connor, supra note 10; Tom Angell, Governor Signs Marijuana Legalization Bill, 
Making History In US Territory, FORBES, Sept. 21, 2018; Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, “Marijuana Overview,” 2017,  http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx. 
22 Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20 at ___. 
23 Hannah Hartig & Abigail Geiger, “About Six-in-Ten Americans Support Marijuana 
Legalization,” Pew Research Center, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/10/08/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/. 
24 But see William A. Galson & E.J. Dionne, Jr., “The New Politics of Marijuana 
Legalization: Why Opinion is Changing,” Governance Studies at Brookings, May 2013, 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Dionne-
Galston_NewPoliticsofMJLeg_Final.pdf (assessing support for legalization and concluding 
that while opposition is unlikely to return to prior levels, consistent trajectory of opinions 
should not be assumed and will depend in part on the effects of ongoing legalization 
measures). 
25 The unique complexities of cannabis legalization in tribal jurisdictions are beyond the 
scope of this paper. See generally Brad A. Bartlett & Garrett L. Davey, Tribes and Cannabis: 
Seeking Parity with States and Consultation and Agreement from the U.S. Government, 64 
FED. LAW. 54 (2017); Katherine Florey, Budding Conflicts: Marijuana's Impact on Unsettled 
Questions of Tribal-State Relations, 58 B.C. L. REV. 991 (2017). 
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On one side, legalization represents the potential to better regulate a 
substance that has remained commonly used despite strict federal prohibition 
and to improve public awareness of the health effects (both adverse and 
therapeutic) of use. On the other, legalization may also increase use 
prevalence and frequency, encourage youth initiation, reproduce existing 
inequities for vulnerable populations, and lead to other social harms. The 
influence of corporatization may exacerbate such negative effects, replicating 
the ills of tobacco and alcohol markets. Legislative approaches to cannabis 
legalization thus present both opportunities and risks for public health. 
 
Public health best practice frameworks provide critical guidance on how 
to regulate cannabis effectively and minimize negative health impacts. A 
public health approach to legalization prioritizes public health over other 
goals, including industry profits, state tax revenues, and business 
development, that, while valid bases for government action generally, may 
lead to detrimental outcomes in regulating potentially harmful substances. A 
public health approach draws on the successes and failures of domestic and 
international regulatory frameworks for other substances, most notably 
tobacco and alcohol. However, these substantive concerns do not exist within 
a vacuum, but rather intersect with the procedural question of how a state 
legalizes adult use cannabis – i.e., ballot initiative or legislation. To further 
understand this intersection, this article assesses the adoption or absence of 
public health best practices in proposed legislative adult use cannabis laws. 
 
Part I provides background information on the history and current status 
of cannabis under U.S. federal and state law. This section also introduces the 
foundations of a public health approach to cannabis legalization based on best 
practices from tobacco and alcohol control. Part II defines a rubric for 
evaluating proposed legislative legalization and applies this rubric to 
proposed bills from 2018–2019, finding that elements of a public health 
approach have gained traction in at least some proposals. Part III discusses 
the implications of these findings, concluding that proactive adoption of adult 
use cannabis legalization via state legislatures could benefit public health by 
obviating pro-industry, advocate-driven initiatives and preserving legislative 
and regulatory flexibility to address developing evidence and implementation 
challenges in the future. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Brief History of Cannabis Legalization in the U.S. 
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1. The Path to Prohibition and Back Again  
 
Cannabis cultivation has a long and complex history in human 
civilization.26 Cannabis was one of the earliest cultivated plants, and its 
potential medicinal properties have been documented in Western medicine 
since the 19th century (and likely much longer in other traditions).27 Cannabis 
appeared in the Pharmacopeia of the United States from 1851 until 1942 with 
reference to use as an analgesic, hypnotic, and anticonvulsant.28 Despite this, 
most states banned cannabis in the early 20th century, and the federal 
government followed suit in 1937.29 Much of this push toward 
criminalization in the early 1900s was rooted in racial animus toward 
Mexican immigrants and African-Americans.30 Various international drug 
control treaties also developed in the early- and mid-20th century, ultimately 
consolidated in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.31 The Single 
Convention and subsequent amendments created a scheduling system for 
controlled substances and obligated treaty parties to criminalize possession 
of such drugs.32 The U.S. played a pivotal role in shaping the treaty, led by 
Harry J. Anslinger, the nation’s first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics (the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) 
who had spearheaded cannabis criminalization in the U.S.33 
 
 
26 See, e.g., Brian M. Blumenfeld, State Legalization of Marijuana and Our American 
System of Federalism: A Historio-Constitutional Primer, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 77, 81–
82 (2017) (discussing cultivation and use dating back to fifth-century Greece and Rome). 
27 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 43. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY 
J. CRIM. L. 99, 104–06 (2018). While not technically a prohibition on cannabis, this was the 
practical effect of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. MARK K. OSBECK & HOWARD 
BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A NUTSHELL 44–45 (West Academic 2017). 
31 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.S.T.S. 
7515; see also DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR & MARTIN JELSMA, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, 
FIFTY YEARS OF THE 1961 SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS: A 
REINTERPRETATION 2–5 (2011), available at https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr12.pdf. 
Potential conflicts between state cannabis legalization and U.S. obligations under this treaty 
are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Michael Tackeff, Constructing a "Creative 
Reading": Will US State Cannabis Legislation Threaten the Fate of the International Drug 
Control Treaties?, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 247 (2018). 
32 Tackeff, supra note 31, at 258–59. The Single Convention also charges the World 
Health Organization (WHO) to assess the dangers posed by illicit drugs. Single Convention, 
supra note 31. WHO published a report on cannabis in 2016, its first in 20 years. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., supra note 2.  
33 BEWLEY-TAYLOR & JELSMA, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
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Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970,34 cannabis became 
one of the most highly restricted drugs under U.S. law.35 The CSA placed 
cannabis (“marihuana” in the statutory language) on Schedule I, meaning it 
was found to have: 1) high potential for abuse, 2) no currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the U.S., and 3) a lack of accepted safety for use 
under medical supervision.36 Other Schedule I drugs include a variety of 
powerful opiates and opium derivatives (e.g., heroin), hallucinogens (e.g., 
LSD), and, as of 2012, several newer synthetic street drugs, including 
synthetic cannabinoids (sometimes called “K2” or “spice”).37 Either 
Congress or the U.S. Attorney General (via the DEA and with 
recommendation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services) has 
authority to revise this approach; however, petitions for rescheduling 
cannabis have failed as recently as 2016,38 despite growing evidence that 
cannabis has some therapeutic utility.39 Congress did legalize hemp 
production under the 2018 Farm Bill;40 however, hemp includes only 
cannabis with minimal concentration of ∆9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, 
responsible for the “high” associated with cannabis intoxication, among other 
effects). 
 
Despite the Schedule I status of cannabis, the FDA has licensed three 
 
34 21 U.S.C. § 812. 
35 Notably, the CSA’s approach to cannabis was in some respects actually less punitive 
than the prior Boggs Act of 1951, which applied mandatory minimum sentencing for simple 
possession. OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 30, at 46–52. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddler: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Juudiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Douglas C. 
Throckmorton, Deputy Director, Regulatory Programs, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.), 
available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-07-
16%20Throckmorton%20Testimony.pdf. 
38 Denial of Petition to Initiative Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 
53767 (Aug. 12, 2016); see also Diane Hoffman, et al., Will The FDA’s Approval Of 
Epidiolex Lead To Rescheduling Marijuana?, Health Aff. Blog, 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180709.904289/full/; JOHN HUDAK & 
GRACE WALLACK, BROOKINGS, HOW TO RESCHEDULE MARIJUANA, AND WHY IT’S 
UNLIKELY ANYTIME SOON (2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/02/13/how-to-reschedule-marijuana-and-
why-its-unlikely-anytime-soon/. The DEA previously rejected petitions for rescheduling 
cannabis in 1989 (responding to a petition originally filed in 1972) and 2011 (responding to 
a petition filed in 2002). See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding DEA’s 1989 denial); Americans for Safe 
Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding DEA’s 2011 
denial). 
39 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 85–140.  
40 Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 10113. 
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medications based on cannabinoid compounds responsible for the drug’s 
effects. Among over one hundred identified cannabinoids, two receive by far 
the most attention from both the medical community and from regulators: 
THC and cannabidiol (CBD).41 The first two FDA-approved cannabinoid 
medications used synthetic THC: dronabinol (trade name Marinol®) and 
nabilone (trade name Cesamet®), both used for chemotherapy-associated 
nausea and vomiting. In 2013 FDA granted investigational new drug status 
to the first medication using non-synthetic cannabinoids derived from the 
cannabis plant, a concentrated CBD oil under the trade name Epidiolex® for 
the treatment of epilepsy-related seizures.42 Because Epidiolex® is derived 
from cannabis itself, some observers see its approval as potentially triggering 
reclassification of cannabis under federal law based on FDA’s formal 
recognition of medical utility, one of the core elements of drug scheduling 
under the CSA.43 
 
Shortly after enactment of the CSA, several states reduced their own 
criminal penalties for cannabis possession, with 11 states enacting such laws 
in the 1970s, though this policy development then stalled until the mid-
1990s.44 In 1996 California became the first state to legalize cannabis for 
medical use under state law, and 7 other states and D.C. followed suit by 
2000.45 The next two decades saw even more sweeping changes. By the end 
of 2018, 20 states and D.C. had decriminalized possession of small amounts 
of cannabis, 15 states had legalized limited forms of medical cannabis (e.g., 
high-CBD, low-THC products), 33 states and D.C. had fully legalized 
medical cannabis, and 10 states and D.C. had legalized adult use cannabis.46 
As of July 2019 there were only 4 states (Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, and South 
Dakota) with total prohibitions on cannabis under state law.47 
 
2. Initiatives and Industry 
 
 
41 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1 at 53–55. 
42 Id. 
43 See generally Y. Tony Yang & Jerzy P. Szaflarski, The US Food and Drug 
Administration’s Authorization of the First Cannabis-Derived Pharmaceutical: Are We Out 
of the Haze?, 76 JAMA NEUROLOGY 135 (2018). 
44  Rosalie L. Pacula, et al., Marijuana Decriminalization: What Does it Mean in the 
United States? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9690, 2003), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9690.pdf. 
45 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Marijuana Deep Dive,” supra note 10. 
46 Id. 
47 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Marijuana Overview,” supra note 21. The 
implications of the 2018 Farm Bill’s legalization of hemp (and thus CBD derived from hemp) 
under federal law, and the myriad resulting questions about how such products are to be 
regulated, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Most state medical and recreational cannabis laws originated as ballot 
initiatives, rather than legislation. Of the 11 state recreational laws, all but 
Vermont’s and Illinois’s were initiatives, as were 18 of the 33 state medical 
laws.48 The ballot initiative process arose from late 19th-century Populist and 
early 20th-century Progressive movements to circumvent the perceived 
dominance of special interests in state legislatures.49 Tobacco control efforts 
in the U.S. are a modern example of the overall anti-special interest character 
of initiatives. Beginning in the 1970s, tobacco control advocates began using 
state ballot initiatives and local-level equivalents to adopt smoking 
restrictions and tobacco taxes, sidestepping the tobacco industry’s 
considerable legislative influence.50 In response, the tobacco industry (in 
partnership with other “ballot-prone” industries) monitored initiative activity 
and advocated for reforms that would make the process more challenging, 
such as increasing signature requirements, reducing signature gathering 
periods, and increasing vote requirements for tax increases.51 
 
Some critics of direct democracy (including ballot initiatives and 
referendums), argue that the susceptibility of electorates to campaign 
advertising allows wealthy interests to dominate the process, enabling exactly 
the type of special interest advantage the process was designed to counter.52 
The tobacco industry, for example, has adopted a tactic of attempting to 
defeat tobacco control initiatives by introducing competing “look-alike” 
initiatives on the same subject that contain fewer or weaker regulations and 
often incorporate preemption of stronger local laws.53 Overall, however, an 
empirical analysis of initiatives relating to three major industries (energy, 
finance, and tobacco) found that enacted initiatives much more often resulted 
in laws contrary to industry interests than beneficial to them.54  
 
Critics of cannabis legalization have also raised the claim that the 
initiative process allows outsized influence of moneyed legalization 
 
48 Id. 
49 JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE UNDER DIRECT VERSUS 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 1–2 (2018), available at 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/Matsusaka_Special_Interests_2018_05.pdf. 
50 Elizabeth Laposata, et al., When tobacco targets direct democracy, 39 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 537, 541–46 (2014).  
51 Id. at 541–42, 545–46. 
52 See MATSUSAKA, supra note 49, at 2–3 (discussing competing views). 
53 See generally Gregory J. Tung, et al., Competing Initiatives: A New Tobacco Industry 
Sstrategy to Oppose Statewide Cclean Indoor Air Ballot Measures, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
430 (2009). 
54 MATSUSAKA, supra note 49, at 11–17. 
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advocates, often based outside of the state in which the initiative is proposed, 
who are able to commit levels of funding that are difficult for opponents to 
counter.55 However, analysis of funding for legalization ballot initiatives 
from 2004–2016 found that industry funding involvement was low in most 
states (with some exceptions).56 While the money raised by advocates is 
substantial and typically considerably higher than that raised by opponents,57 
changing public opinion over time may better explain the increasing success 
of initiatives, though the two are likely related.58 At the same time, there has 
been an increase in cannabis industry contributions to initiatives, particularly 
in the 2015–2016 election cycles, which could indicate an emerging trend 
toward increased industry involvement in the process.59 Overall, the current 
relationship between the cannabis industry and the ballot box appears to 
differ from that of other industries, insomuch as the cannabis industry is 
primarily a beneficiary rather than a target of initiatives and has in many cases 
played only an indirect role in the process. 
 
3. Existing State Frameworks 
 
As of July 2019, successful recreational cannabis initiatives had 
developed exclusively in the context of existing medical legalization 
frameworks. All eleven recreational cannabis states had previously adopted 
medical laws, most by ballot initiative.60 Kilmer and MacCoun argue that 
medical legalization eases later passage of recreational laws by: 1) 
demonstrating the efficacy of voter initiatives in this policy area; 2) enabling 
changes in public perception that destabilize the War on Drugs; 3) increasing 
the evidence base to counter concerns regarding the effects of legalization; 4) 
creating “a visible and active marijuana industry”; and 5) showing that the 
federal government will not prevent state and local jurisdictions from 
collecting cannabis tax revenues.61 Legalization opponents agree that medical 
 
55 See generally SUE RUSCHE, NAT’L FAMILIES IN ACTION, TRACKING THE MONEY 
THAT’S LEGALIZING MARIJUANA AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017), 
http://www.nationalfamilies.org/survey_report.html. 
56 Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20, at ___. 
57 Id. at ___ (reporting mean advocate contributions of $4.3 million compared to $1.2 
million for opponents and median $1.7 million for advocates compared to $30,000 for 
opponents). Total advocate contributions from 2004–2016 exceeded opponent contributions 
by over $100 million ($139 million to $37.3 million). Id. at ___. 
58 Id. at ___. 
59 Id. at ___. 
60 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “State Medical Marijuana Laws” (2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
61 Beau Kilmer & Robert J. MacCoun, How Medical Marijuana Smoothed the Transition 
to Marijuana Legalization in the United States, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 181, 192–97 
(2017). 
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cannabis laws facilitate later recreational laws, sometimes claiming that 
medical laws are mere pretext for recreational use or legalization.62 
 
In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize 
adult use cannabis, followed by Alaska and Oregon in 2014, California, 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Maine in 2016, Michigan and Vermont in 2018,63 
and Illinois in 2019.  
 
Vermont’s law is unique among this group in two respects. First, it was 
the first to pass legalization legislatively. Second, while Vermont’s law made 
cannabis possession legal as of its effective date (July 1, 2018), it left 
legalization and oversight of legal sales for a later date. As of July 2019, the 
legislature had not passed a sales measure, and multiple Vermont bills are 
included in this analysis. Vermont’s current law is more an extension of 
decriminalization (eliminating not only criminal, but also civil penalties), 
rather than full legalization as more commonly understood.64 
 
Implementation delays and political conflicts between industry, local 
government, and state government have been common in several states that 
have legalized adult use.65 Due to these delays and the recentness of most of 
the initiatives, there are limited comprehensive analyses of these laws. The 
most in-depth of these assesses the legal frameworks in Colorado, 
Washington, Oregon, and Alaska, ultimately concluding that these states 
incorporated approximately one-third to one-half of identified public health 
best practices into their cannabis regulatory structures.66 
 
The lack of public health-oriented approaches in these laws likely reflects 
 
62 RUSCHE, supra note 55, at 12–13. 
63 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, "Marijuana Deep Dive," supra note 10.  
64 The legalization law in effect in D.C. similarly allows for possession, but not sales, in 
part due to restrictions imposed by Congress. Petula Dvorak, Monuments, Museaums, 
Marijuana: Take a Whiff of D.C.'s New Pot-Infused Tourism, WASH. POST, April 22, 2019. 
A popular work-around to the law in D.C. sees cannabis provided as a “gift” with the 
purchase of some other item at a wildly inflated price (e.g., artwork, baked goods). Id. 
65  This is particularly true of Maine, which only lifted a moratorium on implementation 
of key portions of its 2016 law in 2018 (and then only by overriding a gubernatorial veto). 
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Marijuana Overview,” supra note 21. See also 
Patrick McGreevy, California’s Black Market for Pot is Stifling Legal Sales. Now the 
Governor Wants to Step Up Eenforcement., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2019; Michael R. Blood, 
25 Local Governments Sue over California Marijuana Delivery, ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 
5, 2019. 
66 Rachel Barry & Stanton Glantz, Marijuana Regulatory Frameworks in Four US 
States: An Analysis Against a Public Health Standard, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 914, 915 
(2018). The specific standards in this analysis are discussed more fully infra. 
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their origins. Advocates who advanced these initiatives consciously adopted 
the framing of alcohol policy as an effective political tool, urging voters to 
“Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol.”67 This framing was an evolution in 
approach by advocates, who moved away from arguments based primarily on 
personal freedom to also include those emphasizing tax revenue, social 
justice, and the differences in legal treatment of alcohol (an intoxicating 
substance that is widely available and lightly regulated) and cannabis (an 
intoxicating substance that is criminalized).68 This line of argument appears 
to have resonated with voters, as these newly-branded legalization initiatives 
were substantially more successful than earlier efforts.69 Given this framing, 
it is not surprising that the statutes enacted by the initiatives and the 
regulations that followed generally accord with alcohol policy.70 
Unfortunately, U.S. alcohol control laws frequently fail to reflect public 
health best practices, particularly with regard to preventing underage use and 
heavy consumption.71 As a result, “regulating marijuana like alcohol” has 
meant a pro-business approach that is not designed to reduce use. 
 
Based on electoral results and public opinion surveys, momentum 
currently appears to favor legalization generally.72 The exact parameters of a 
new legal framework for cannabis, however, may not yet be established. One 
of the most pressing questions in the coming years will be whether 
legislatures can better incorporate public health goals into legalization laws 
compared to the approaches offered to date by advocates via the initiative 
process. 
 
B.  The Public Health Approach 
 
A public health approach to cannabis legalization prioritizes public health 
over other policy goals. This article leverages the successes and failures of 
domestic and international approaches to other substances, most notably 
 
67 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Marijuana Push in Colorado Likens It to Alcohol, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2012; Matt Ferner, Why Marijuana Should Be Legalized: ‘Regulate Marijuana Like 
Alcohol’ Campaign Discusses Why Pot Prohibition Has Been A Failure, HUFFPOST, Aug. 
28, 2012. 
68 Ferner, supra note 67; Molly Ball, Will Colorado Legalize Pot?, ATLANTIC, Oct. 9, 
2012. 
69 See Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20 (detailing results of legalization initiatives over 
time).  
70 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66, at 915. 
71 John T. Carnevale, et al., A Practical Framework for Regulating For-Profit 
Recreational Marijuana in US States: Lessons from Colorado and Washington, 42 INT’L J. 
DRUG POL’Y 71, 74 (2017); see also Barry & Glantz, supra note 66. 
72 See generally Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20.  
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tobacco and alcohol, to outline a rubric for evaluation of public health best 
practices for cannabis regulation. To do so, it draws on several key resources, 
including reports and policy statements by governmental entities and non-
governmental health organizations, international agreements, and health 
policy scholarship, to define the public health approach. 
 
1. Existing Models: Health Policy Organizations and International 
Agreements 
 
a. American Public Health Association 
 
The American Public Health Association (APHA) released a policy 
statement in 2014 focused on prioritization of public health in the regulation 
of commercial cannabis.73 APHA has similar policy statements relating to 
alcohol, tobacco, and substance use, as well as a prior statement on cannabis 
(but not legalization specifically).74 Drawing from both tobacco and alcohol 
control, APHA lists five broad areas of concern to public health in cannabis 
legalization: 1) increased availability, 2) passive exposures, 3) quality control 
and consumer protection, 4) motor vehicle safety, and 5) health effects.75 
 
APHA proposes general strategies and action steps, for the most part 
without suggesting a specific standard. Based on alcohol control policy, 
APHA calls for 1) retailer liability for injuries to others (i.e., dram shop 
liability for overservice), 2) impaired driving enforcement, and 3) high 
minimum purchase age standards (generally supporting a minimum age of 
21).76 Based on tobacco control policy, APHA recommends 4) warning 
labels, 5) secondhand exposure measures (e.g., public location bans, 
restrictions on use in multi-unit housing), and 6) cultivation worker 
protections. Drawing from both alcohol and tobacco control, APHA 
recommends 7) taxation at levels sufficient to price minors out of the market 
and reduce access, 8) limits on the days and times of retail operation, 9) 
restrictions on outlet locations and geographic density, 10) constraints on 
advertising aimed at adolescents, children, communities of color, and groups 
of low socioeconomic status, and 11) continuing monitoring of regulatory 
interventions. APHA also calls for support and funding for health effects 
 
73  Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, Regulating Commercially Legalized Marijuana as a Public 
Health Priority (Policy No. 201410)  (2014), available at https://www.apha.org/policies-and-
advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2015/01/23/10/17/regulating-
commercially-legalized-marijuana-as-a-public-health-priority. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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research; use of cannabis tax revenue to cover regulatory costs and to fund 
prevention, treatment, and research; and “development and availability of 
linguistically competent educational and informational materials for 
individuals with limited English proficiency.”77 
 
b. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC)78 and its implementing guidelines,79 while not 
designed specifically for cannabis regulation, are a key touchstone for the 
modern evidence-based public health approach to product regulation and thus 
carry significant weight as a model for regulating cannabis. The FCTC is a 
widely adopted health treaty with 168 signatories that sets the global standard 
for tobacco control,80 combining price and tax measures to reduce product 
demand, non-price strategies to reduce demand, and supply reduction 
interventions. 
 
FCTC Article 8 targets protection from secondhand/environmental 
tobacco smoke,81 adopting as a fundamental principle that “[a]ll people 
should be protected from exposure to tobacco smoke[, and a]ll indoor 
workplaces and indoor public places should be smoke free.”82 The 
Implementing Guidelines clarify that any measures short of total elimination 
of smoking in a space or environment (e.g., ventilation, filtration) are 
ineffective and insufficient.83 Given the similarities between tobacco smoke 
and cannabis smoke,84 this approach strongly resonates for cannabis 
regulation.85 
 
77 Id. 
78 World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [hereinafter “WHO 
FCTC”] (2003), available at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf?ua=1. 
79 World Health Org., WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Guidelines 
for Implementation [hereinafter "WHO FCTC Guidelines"]  (2013), available at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/80510/9789241505185_eng.pdf?sequence=
1. 
80  WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at v. While the U.S. is not a Party to the FCTC, U.S. law 
has incorporated several elements of the treaty, primarily via the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). 
81 WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at 8. 
82 WHO FCTC Guidelines, supra note 79, at 20–21. 
83 Id.  
84 David Moir, et al., A Comparison of Mainstream and Sidestream Marijuana and 
Tobacco Cigarette Smoke Produced under Two Machine Smoking Conditions, 21 CHEMICAL 
RES. TOXICOLOGY 494 (2008). 
85 Additionally, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning 
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Article 9 deals with regulation of product contents.86 The Implementing 
Guidelines specifically note that “[f]rom the perspective of public health, 
there is no justification for permitting the use of ingredients, such as 
flavouring agents, which help make tobacco products attractive.”87 The same 
can be said for additives in cannabis products intended to stimulate use or to 
attract youth or vulnerable populations. 
 
Article 11 addresses packaging and labeling and obligates Parties to 
ensure that these elements are not “false, misleading, deceptive or likely to 
create an erroneous impression” about a product or its health effects.88 Article 
11 also requires health warnings for all products to be rotating, large, and 
clearly visible, to cover at least 30% (ideally at least 50%) of the product’s 
principal display area, and to include pictorial elements.89 The Implementing 
Guidelines further encourage plain packaging requirements, which prohibit 
all branding elements.90 
 
Article 13 calls for a “comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship,” as consistent with applicable constitutional principles.91 To the 
extent a comprehensive ban is not possible, Article 13 obligates Parties to 
prohibit marketing that is false or misleading, require warnings on all 
advertisements, restrict the use of incentives, require disclosure of advertising 
expenditures, restrict or ban advertising using mass media, and restrict or 
 
Engineers (ASHRAE), which publishes a highly influential set of ventilation standards for 
indoor air quality, revised its definition of “environmental tobacco smoke” in 2016 to include 
both electronic smoking devices and cannabis smoke.  Am. Soc’y of Heating, Refrigerating 
and Air Condition Eng’rs, “ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 62.1-2016 : Ventilation for Acceptable 
Indoor Air Quality” (2019), available at https://www.ashrae.org/technical-
resources/bookstore/standards-62-1-62-2. See also Stella A. Bialous & Stanton A. Glantz, 
ASHRAE Standard 62: Tobacco Industry's Influence over National Ventilation Standards, 
11 TOBACCO CONTROL 315 (2002) (describing the importance of ASHRAE standards and 
the tobacco industry’s efforts to influence them). 
86 WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at 9. 
87 WHO FCTC Guidelines, supra note 79, at 33. 
88 WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at 9–10. 
89 Id. 
90 WHO FCTC Guidelines, supra note 79, at 63. 
91 WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at 11. The Guidelines’ major caveat for constitutional 
commercial speech protections was the result of U.S. demands, Adoption of Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 689–90 (2003), though the U.S. 
remains one of the few WHO members that is not a Party to the treaty. World Health Org., 
“WHO Member States (by regions) that are NOT parties to the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control”  (2010),  
https://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/non_parties/en/. 
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prohibit industry sponsorship of event and activities.92 
 
Article 16 addresses sales to and by minors (age 18 or as set by relevant 
law) by requiring age verification, banning self-service product displays, 
prohibiting other products (e.g., sweets) in the form of tobacco products, 
limiting vending machine access to age-restricted areas, prohibiting free 
product giveaways, and prohibiting sale of small-quantity products that 
increase affordability.93 
 
Other FCTC provisions call for price and tax measures to reduce 
consumption,94 effective public education campaigns,95 demand-reduction 
measures focused on treatment and cessation,96 reduction of illicit trade,97 
support for alternative commercial activities for industry-dependent 
workers,98 and protection of the environment and the health of cultivation 
workers,99 all of which have relevance to cannabis regulation. 
 
c. CDC Task Force on Community Preventive Services 
 
Using an evidence-based approach that considers both efficacy and cost-
effectiveness, the CDC Task Force on Community Preventive Services 
recommends interventions to improve health across various policy areas, 
including both tobacco and alcohol. To reduce tobacco initiation, use, and 
secondhand exposure, the Task Force recommends: 1) comprehensive 
tobacco control programs; 2) increasing unit price; 3) implementing mass-
reach health communication interventions; 4) adopting smokefree policies; 
and 5) mobilizing the community with additional interventions. 100 
 
To reduce and prevent excess alcohol consumption, the Task Force 
recommends: 1) dram shop liability; 2) electronic screening and brief 
interventions; 3) increasing taxes; 4) limits on days and hours of sale; 5) 
regulation of outlet density; and 6) enhanced enforcement of laws prohibiting 
 
92 WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at 11–12. 
93 Id. at 15–16. 
94 Id. at 7–8. 
95 Id. at 10–11. 
96 Id. at 13. 
97 Id. at 13–15. 
98 Id. at 16. 
99 Id.  
100 Community Preventive Services Task Force, CPSTF Findings for Tobacco (2019),  
https://www.thecommunityguide.org/content/task-force-findings-tobacco. 
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sales to minors.101 The Task Force also recommends against privatization of 
retail sales.102 
d. Healthy People 2020 
 
Managed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy 
People is a collaborative initiative that sets national 10-year goals and 
measurable objectives to improve health and well-being of people and 
communities. The Healthy People 2020 leading health indicators for 
substance abuse and tobacco are, collectively: adolescent use in past 30 days, 
adult cigarette smoking, and adult binge drinking in the past month.103 The 
same issues—adolescent use, use of inhaled or smoked products, and 
excessive or binge use—are among the most critical regulatory targets for 
cannabis. While framed as goals rather than specific policy prescriptions, the 
Healthy People 2020 objectives are highly relevant in assessing the design of 
cannabis laws and include several implicit policy recommendations. For 
example, the goal of eliminating laws that preempt local control implies a 
recommendation to include non-preemption in newly-created laws. 
 
Relevant Healthy People 2020 substance use objectives include: 1) 
reducing youth use; 2) increasing youth disapproval of use and perception of 
risk; 3) reducing binge use; and 4) decreasing impaired driving fatalities.104 
Similarly, objectives for tobacco use include: 1) reducing use by adults and 
adolescents, 2) reducing initiation among children, adolescents, and young 
adults; 3) reducing proportion of nonsmokers exposed to secondhand smoke; 
4) increasing proportion of persons covered by indoor worksite policies that 
prohibit smoking; 5) establishing smoke-free laws that prohibit smoking in 
public places and worksites; 6) eliminating state laws that preempt stronger 
local tobacco control laws; 7) increasing product taxes; 8) reducing 
proportion of adolescents and young adults exposed to product marketing; 
and 9) reducing illegal sales to minors by enforcing prohibitions on such 
 
101 Cmty. Preventive Servs. Task Force, “CPSTF Findings for Excessive Alcohol 
Consumption” (2019), available at https://www.thecommunityguide.org/content/task-force-
findings-excessive-alcohol-consumption. 
102 Id.   
103 U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., Office of Disease Prevention and Health 
Promotion, “Healthy People 2020 Topics & Objectives: Substance Use” (2019), 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/substance-abuse/objectives; 
U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 
“Healthy People 2020 Topics & Objectives: Tobacco Use” (2019), 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/tobacco-use/objectives. 
104 U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., “Healthy People 2020 Topics & Objectives: 
Substance Use” (2019), supra note 103. 
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sales.105 
 
2. Existing Models: Health Policy Scholarship 
 
While there has been meaningful scholarship about cannabis 
criminalization and the potential for other regulatory alternatives for some 
time,106 health policy scholarship focused on how to regulate legal cannabis 
from a public health perspective developed in earnest after passage of 
Colorado and Washington’s 2012 initiatives to legalize adult use.  
 
In particular, much of the substantive scholarship in this area has been 
produced by researchers in the RAND Corporation’s Drug Policy Research 
Center.107 Pacula et al. propose a cannabis-specific policy framework based 
on tobacco and alcohol control that centers on five policy objectives designed 
to minimize youth access and use, drugged driving, dependency and 
addiction, consumption of products with unwanted contaminants or uncertain 
potency, and concurrent use of cannabis and alcohol (particularly in 
public).108 Toward this end, they recommend: 1) artificially high prices via 
taxation and enforcement; 2) a state monopoly on production, distribution, 
and/or sale; 3) restriction of licenses and monitoring of licensees; 4) limiting 
types of products sold, including additives, flavorings, and cannabinoid 
content; 5) restrictions on marketing to the extent possible under US law, 
including plain packaging requirements; 6) limiting public consumption; 7) 
measuring and preventing impaired driving, and 8) a comprehensive product 
tracking system.109 
 
105 U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., “Healthy People 2020 Topics & Objectives: 
Tobacco Use” (2019), supra note 103. 
106 See, e.g., ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING 
FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, & PLACES   (Charles Wolf Jr. ed., Cambridge University Press 
2001). 
107 See, e.g., id.;  JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, ET AL., RAND CORP., CONSIDERING 
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS (2015), 
available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.readonline.html; Rosalie L. 
Pacula, et al., RAND Corp., Developing Public Health Regulations for Marijuana: Lessons 
from Alcohol and Ttobacco, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1021 (2014); Beau Kilmer, Policy 
Designs for Cannabis Legalization: Starting with the Eight Ps, 40 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL 
ABUSE 259 (2014); Beau Kilmer, The "10 P's" of Marijuana Legalization, Spring 2015 
BERKELEY REV. LATIN AM. STUD. 52 (2015); Jonathan P. Caulkins, et al., Marijuana 
Legalization: Certainty, Impossibility, Both, or Neither?, 5 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 
(2012); see also RAND Corp., “RAND Drug Policy Research Center: Center Staff” (2019), 
URL: https://www.rand.org/well-being/justice-policy/centers/dprc/about/staff.html (listing 
RAND affiliates). 
108 Pacula, et al., supra note 107, at 1022. 
109 Id. at 1022–25. 
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Two other RAND papers present slates of key policy choices for state 
legalization without making specific recommendations. Kilmer emphasizes 
that “legalization is not a binary choice”110 and suggests a set of ten policy 
choices (stylized as the “10 P’s”):  
 
• Production: the number of producers and amount of production to be 
allowed, locations where production will be allowed, and types of 
products to be allowed on the market; 
• Profit motive: whether to allow profit-maximizing firms to enter the 
market or to restrict the market to nonprofit organizations, “for-
benefit corporations,” or a state-run monopoly; 
• Promotion: whether to allow advertising; 
• Prevention: whether to devote resources to prevention efforts, 
including youth prevention, and how to fund such efforts; 
• Policing and enforcement: how much time and effort to devote to 
enforcement of remaining prohibitions (e.g., on public consumption) 
and how to address remain black market cannabis producers and 
distributors; 
• Penalties: how to sanction noncompliance, including license 
revocation, civil penalties, and criminal penalties; 
• Potency: whether to limit THC content or other cannabinoids; 
• Purity: whether and how to regulate mold, pesticides, and other 
contaminants, and whether to allow alcohol- or nicotine-infused 
cannabis products on the market; 
• Price: how to shape cannabis price, including through license fees, 
regulations, and taxes; and  
• Permanency: how much regulatory flexibility to incorporate into legal 
frameworks, such as creating independent commissions or including 
sunset provisions, to address changing evidence and new products.111 
 
Similarly, Caulkins et al. provide a “regulatory checklist” in eight 
categories: 1) types of products allowed; 2) cannabinoid content; 3) retail 
outlets and delivery; 4) sales to nonresidents; 5) pricing controls; 6) 
prevention and countermarketing; 7) vertical integration; and 8) local 
autonomy.112 The authors emphasize the importance of careful consideration 
of policy alternatives in cannabis regulation and the necessity of thinking 
beyond alcohol control models: 
 
110 Kilmer, The "10 P's"of Marijuana Legalization, supra note 107, at 53. 
111 Id.  
112 CAULKINS, ET AL. (2015), supra note 107, at 103–05. 
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A jurisdiction considering something other than marijuana 
prohibition needs to encourage serious conversations about each of 
these choices. Marijuana is a very different commodity from other 
regulated goods (even alcohol) and early-adopting states simply 
cannot use cookie-cutter regulations for alcohol to cover all of the 
important choices.113 
 
 Writing in an international context on behalf of the Transform Drug 
Policy Foundation for a Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly on the World Drug Problem, Rolles and Murkin make 
recommendations across production, price, tax, consumption methods, 
potency, packaging, retailer regulation, consumer regulation, retail outlets, 
and marketing. The authors make several of the same recommendations as 
other reports cited supra, and also add several specific elements, including: 
separation of ownership between production and retail entities; 114 restriction 
of home growth based on age and production capacity; 115 price controls; 116 
taxation at both production and sales tiers based on THC content by weight;117 
mandatory opaque, resealable, and child-resistant plastic containers;118 on-
package messaging modelled on pharmaceuticals and tobacco products; 119 
escalating penalties for noncompliance, including license revocation; 120 
restrictions on retailer locations near age-sensitive areas and prohibition of 
sales of non-cannabis products; 121 and a total ban on all forms of advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship based on WHO FCTC Article 13. 122 The authors 
also make several policy recommendations that less frequently appear in (or 
even contradict) other sources, including: promoting small-scale social clubs; 
123 avoiding directing excessive revenue to drug treatment, prevention, or 
other social programs to prevent dependence on cannabis sales revenue;124 
and encouraging non-smoked consumption methods, including vaporized 
products (contingent on additional research). 125  
 
113 Id. at 112–13. 
114 STEVE ROLLES & GEORGE MURKIN, TRANSFORM DRUG POL’Y FOUND., HOW TO 
REGULATE CANNABIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 50–51 (2014). 
115 Id.  
116 Id. 72–74. 
117 Id. at 84–85. 
118 Id. at 117–18. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 125–26. 
121 Id. at 142–43. 
122 Id. at 150–51. 
123 Id. at 50–51. 
124 Id. at 84–85. 
125 Id. at 91–93. 
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 Based explicitly on alcohol control policy lessons, Moser recommends 
policies targeting social availability, commercial availability, taxation and 
price, driving under the influence, advertising, and market structure.126 
Among the specific proposals that stand out from other frameworks are 
application of civil liability to social hosts who provide cannabis to minors 
at home and to commercial sellers/retailers (i.e., dram shop liability); 
mandatory training for servers and sellers; restrictions on outlet density; 
restrictions on home delivery; a prohibition on price promotions; zero 
tolerance laws for youth driving under the influence; permitting advertising 
in electronic media only when less than 15% of the audience is under 21; a 
government-controlled or non-profit market structure; limits on the number 
of licenses in each license tier and restrictions on production or volume per 
license; restrictions on vertical integration; prohibition of volume discounts 
between license tiers; and minimum price markups at the wholesale and 
retail levels.127 
 
Leveraging lessons learned from the specific experiences of Colorado and 
Washington, the first two states to legalize adult use, Carnevale et al. offer 
policy proposals in five areas: “cultivation, production, and processing; sales, 
consumption, and possession; taxes and finance; public health and safety; and 
governance.”128 Notably, the authors explicitly adopt “practicality”129 as their 
primary touchstone, rather than theoretically ideal policy.130 As a result, there 
are several public health-oriented policies they note would be desirable, but 
do not recommend because they judge them to be impractical, including plain 
packaging,131 minimum unit pricing,132 and non-commercial or not-for-profit 
market structure.133 
  
Owing to the emphasis on practicality and likelihood of adoption, 
 
126 JAMES F. MOSHER, COUNTY OF VENTURA, THE 2016 CALIFORNIA MARIJUANA 
INITIATIVE AND YOUTH: LESSONS FROM ALCOHOL POLICY 4, 8 (2016), available at 
http://venturacountylimits.org/resource_documents/VC-MJ-AUMA-FNL-REV2-web.pdf. 
127 Id.  
128 Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 74. 
129 The authors’ approach to practicality relies on a judgment of “what [the authors] 
believe are the practically viable legalization regimes likely to occur in US states under 
current circumstances and law […] begin[ning] with the approach that [they] judge most 
likely to be implemented.” Id. at 72. As part of this judgment, the authors include “US 
culture, the parties at work in the legalization movement, existing federal law and federal 
guidance […], and the experience of states that have legalized.” Id.  
130 Id. at 72, 74. 
131 Id. at 78. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 72. 
24     CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 
Carnevale et al. recommend a more limited, but still important, suite of 
policies. Those that add to previously cited proposals include: 
 
• Restricting use to those 21 years and older with significant penalties 
for sales to minors;134 
• Maximum limit on sales quantity per person or transaction;135  
• Unitary recreational and medical regulatory system;136 
• Taxes designed to keep prices artificially high without fueling the 
illicit market;137 
• Robust data collection and performance monitoring;138 and 
• Restrictions on industry involvement in the regulatory process based 
on alcohol and tobacco control.139  
 
The authors supplement these specific recommendations within an 
overarching emphasis on regulatory flexibility, viewing as paramount the 
ability of government to adjust to new data, new products, and other 
developments.140 They also aptly describe a key difference between existing 
regulatory approaches to tobacco and alcohol that is especially relevant to 
cannabis policy decisions: 
 
[E]ven a brief examination of the US alcohol and tobacco industries 
illustrates how regulatory goals can affect markets, even within 
commercialized, for-profit models that share much in common. US 
alcohol and tobacco systems look quite similar at first blush; yet, alcohol 
regulations seek to limit use in specific circumstances (e.g., by youth or 
by adults at work, in public, or while driving) but do not seek to discourage 
use—that is, they do not attempt to reduce the size of the market. In 
contrast, current US tobacco regulations actively seek to reduce the size of 
the industry . . . .141 
 
Barry and Glantz provide a detailed framework for assessing adult use 
cannabis laws based on a survey of public health best practices from tobacco 
control, arguing that alcohol control models are typically inadequate to 
protect public health. They offer a 30-point assessment across 11 policy 
 
134 Id. at 77. 
135 Id. The authors do not recommend a specific limit, but do note a 1-ounce limit in 
multiple states. Id. 
136 Id. at 82. 
137 Id. at 78. 
138 Id. at 83. 
139 Id. at 81. 
140 Id. at 71, 75–76, 81, 83. 
141 Id. at 74. 
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areas,142expanded in a subsequent paper to a 67-point framework across 16 
policy areas.143 Some of the included policy prescriptions are quite detailed 
and thus better suited to evaluating regulations than legislation,144  but the 
most critical elements they recommend that have not already been discussed 
include: 
 
• State health department as lead regulatory agency; 
• Creation of advisory groups that have expertise in cannabis 
prevention and control with strict conflict of interest prohibitions and 
a prohibition on industry participation; 
• Licensure fees that cover costs of administration and enforcement; 
• Frequent, routine, and unannounced compliance checks with 
dedicated revenue; 
• Prohibition on point-of-sale displays, with all products sold behind 
the counter; 
• Prohibition on electronic commerce (e.g., sales via text message or 
social media); 
• Prohibition on use of cartoon characters or imagery encouraging use 
or consumption; 
• Prohibition on brand stretching or sharing; 
• Prohibition on product placements or paid popular media promotions; 
• Dedicated revenue for enforcement, prevention and control, and 
research; 
• Smokefree laws that prohibit cannabis use where tobacco use is 
prohibited; 
• Non-preemption of local smoking restrictions, licensing, and retail 
sales environment control; 
• Prohibition on additives that are toxic or injurious (e.g., nicotine), 
enhance color or palatability (e.g., menthol), imply a health benefit 
(e.g., vitamins), or are associated with energy and vitality (e.g., 
caffeine); and 
• Government approval of all packaging and labeling.145 
 
Cannabis regulation is a complex and multifaceted area that intersects 
 
142 Rachel A. Barry & Stanton A. Glantz, A Public Health Framework for Legalized 
Retail Marijuana Based on the US Experience: Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, 13 PLOS 
MED. e1002131, 4 (2016). 
143 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66, at 914, Supplemental Table A. 
144 The authors created the framework to apply to the collective body of state law 
regulating cannabis, including initiatives, bills, executive orders, and administrative rules. 
Id. at 914–15.  
145 Id. at 914, Supplemental Table A. 
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with numerous areas of law (e.g., land use, insurance, professional 
regulation), but this article concerns itself exclusively with measures directly 
relating to protecting public health. Even with multiple public health 
frameworks to draw from, there remain several important health issues 
beyond the scope of this article. These include, among others, equity and 
social justice programs to ameliorate impacts of the War on Drugs,146 
restrictions on pesticide use and other elements of cultivation,147 
comprehensive product testing requirements,148 cannabis worker 
protections,149 constraints on actual or apparent conflicts of interest among 
state and local government employees and law enforcement personnel,150 and 
protections for employees and renters against discrimination for cannabis 
use.151 While this paper focuses on specific provisions common across 
multiple public health best practice models for tobacco, alcohol, and cannabis 
regulation, such other legal elements also have clear ties to health and should 
receive due consideration and analysis. 
 
This paper also focuses on state law. As such, it does not address cannabis 
regulation at the federal level or the interaction of cannabis regulation and 
federalism. Should the federal government alter its approach to cannabis, this 
would certainly have substantial implications for state laws; however, the 
public health approach outlined here (and advanced by others) would also 
apply to a potential federal legalization framework. Cannabis regulation on 
sovereign tribal lands and conflict with international treaty obligations are 
also beyond the scope of this article, though emerging cannabis legalization 
 
146 Such provisions include those addressing, among other issues, expungement of prior 
criminal convictions for cannabis possession, limitation of criminal consequences for 
cannabis possession by minors, and provision of targeted funding to community 
reinvestment for populations disproportionately affected by cannabis criminalization. See, 
e.g., Bender, supra note 19, at 16–20. 
147 See, e.g. Nate Seltenrich, Into the Weeds: Regulating Pesticides in Cannabis, 127 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 42001 (2019). 
148 See, e.g., Todd Subritzky, et al., Issues in the Implementation and Evolution of the 
Ccommercial Recreational Cannabis Market in Colorado, 27 INT'L J. DRUG POL’Y 1, 6–7 
(2016). 
149 See, e.g., Kevin M. Walters, et al., An Overview of Health and Ssafety in the Colorado 
Cannabis Industry, 61 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 451 (2018). 
150 See generally Candice M. Bowling & Stanton A. Glantz, Conflict of Interest 
Provisions in State Laws Governing Medical and Adult Use Cannabis, 109 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 423 (2019). 
151 See, e.g., Connor P. Burns, I Was Gonna Get a Job, But Then I Got High: An 
Examination of Cannabis and Employment in the Post-Barbuto Regime, 99 B.U. L. REV. 643 
(2019); Jinouth Vasquez Santos, Pot-Protective Employment Laws Loom in 2019, 41 L.A. 
LAW. 12 (2018); Bender, supra note 19, at 701–04; Bruce D. Stout & Bennett A. Barlyn, The 
Human and Fiscal Toll of America's Drug War: One State's Experience, 6 ALBANY GOV'T 
L. REV. 525, 560 (2013).  
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frameworks in Canada and Uruguay are likely to establish a path forward in 
one or both of these areas. 
 
 
II. PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH RUBRIC FOR LEGISLATIVE ADULT USE 
CANNABIS LEGALIZATION 
 
Based on the foundational frameworks discussed in Part I, supra, this 
section applies a consolidated set of sixteen core public health elements 
common across existing recommendations and best practice compilations 
that are suitable for inclusion at the statutory level in proposed adult use 
legislation.152 These elements situate in three broad categories: 1) market and 
regulatory structures; 2) consumer-facing product and retailer regulation; and 
3) youth, environmental exposure, and normalization. We apply these 
principles to a set of bills representing all active state legislation as of 
February 2019, as detailed in the Appendix. 
 
A.  Market and Regulatory Structures 
 
1. Health Department Authority 
 
The priorities and approaches of regulatory agencies will shape the effects 
of legalization nearly as much as initial enabling legislation. One of the most 
critical aspects of legalization legislation is therefore the government agency 
or agencies charged with developing and enforcing subsequent regulations. 
Legislatures may grant this authority to a variety of existing entities or create 
entirely new ones; however, from a public health perspective, the ideal 
approach is to designate the applicable health authority (i.e., state health 
department or equivalent) as the lead agency for this purpose.153  
  
Other authorities (e.g., tax boards) are capable of such regulation and may 
play supporting roles, but placing public health in the lead role fosters a 
regulatory approach that prioritizes public health over private industry profit 
when the two are in conflict, as is often the case.154 Legislatures can 
 
152 There are a number of other critical elements in existing adult use cannabis laws and 
proposed laws that have important public health effects. We have not included, for example, 
provisions that remain the subject of unsettled debate within the public health community, 
such as specific limits on the potency of cannabis and cannabis products. We have also not 
included elements more likely to be addressed through regulatory action than in statute, such 
as the content of public education campaigns. 
153 See, e.g., Barry, et al., supra note 16, at 3. 
154 Id. This is not to say that a for-profit market is a given. As discussed infra, a state-
controlled or not-for-profit market is preferable from a public health perspective. However, 
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appropriately charge the health authority with a mandate to limit or 
discourage use for the benefit of public health. Health authorities often 
operate with such goals in regulating tobacco, for example, and are well-
positioned to do so for cannabis. However, to date, legalizing states have 
instead typically created new cannabis-specific agencies or given regulatory 
authority to existing alcohol control boards or departments of tax/revenue.155 
Such bodies are more likely to have mandates to encourage business 
development or manage revenue. 
 
While, as of July 2019, several existing adult use states included their 
health department or equivalent among the administrative agencies tasked 
with implementation of adult use legalization,156 none have made their health 
department the lead or primary agency, often vesting authority in liquor 
control boards or state commerce departments.157 However, some proposed 
bills would establish the state health department as the lead regulatory 
authority, including in Hawaii158 and Minnesota,159 the latter of which also 
includes explicit reference to “public health standards and practices” as 
guiding principles for implementation.160 A West Virginia bill would place 
adult use cannabis under the regulatory authority of the Bureau for Public 
 
even in such systems, there may be a role for private companies and, as such, potential for 
conflict between private and public interests. 
155 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66 (assessing Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and 
Washington); California Proposition 64 (2016) §§ 26001(b), 26010 (Bureau of Marijuana 
Control within Department of Consumer Affairs); Nevada State Question 2 (2016) § 3(4), 5 
(Department of Taxation); Massachusetts Question 4 (2016) § 76 (creating Cannabis Control 
Commission); Michigan Question 1 (2018) §§ 3, 7.1 (Department of Licensing and 
Regulatory Affairs). See also Maine Question 1 (2016) § 2444 (granting authority to 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry). 
156 For example, the California Department of Public Health oversees standards for 
cannabis manufacturing, including production, packaging, and labeling of all cannabis 
products. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 26012(3), 26106. 
157 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325 (authority of the Washington State Liquor 
and Cannabis Board); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.025 (powers of Oregon Liquor Control 
Commission); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26012(1) (authority of Bureau of Cannabis 
Control within Department of Consumer Affairs); ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.080 (powers of 
Marijuana Control Board within Department of Commerce, Community and Economic 
Development). Illinois’s new law similarly vests most authority in the Department of 
Agriculture and Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, with the Department 
of Public Health in a supporting and advisory role. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
§§ 5-10, 5-15, 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019). 
158 H.B. 1581 §§ 1, 11 (Haw. 2019). 
159 H.F. 420 §§ 3–4 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619 §§ 3–4 (Minn. 2019). 
160 H.F. 420 § 1, subdiv. 18 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619 § 1, subdiv. 18 (Minn. 2019). 
Another, less comprehensive Minnesota bill also includes a provision making the state health 
department the primary agency. H.F. 4541 § 3, subdiv. 1 (Minn. 2017). 
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020) 29 
Health,161 which also regulates the state’s medical cannabis program.162 A 
Missouri bill would vest primary authority for regulation in the Division of 
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, within the state’s Department of Public 
Safety.163 
 
Several other proposed bills would give the state health department 
authority over some aspects of the adult use regulatory program, such as 
regulating testing and manufacturing,164 designing safety inserts,165 
administering community reinvestment grants and cannabis health and safety 
funds,166 or collecting and analyzing data.167 Others would place the health 
department in a more limited or advisory role, such as providing assistance 
on labeling rules168 or consulting on development of a public health campaign 
regarding adult use cannabis.169  
 
2. State Monopoly or Non-Profit Requirement 
 
State control of one or more aspects of the cannabis market is likely to 
help mitigate negative public health impacts of legalization. In alcohol policy, 
government monopolies allow control of price, location, advertising, and 
other elements that affect behavior, particularly excessive consumption.170 
Transitioning from state-run to privatized alcohol markets is associated with 
 
161 H.B. 2331 § 16A-17-6 (W. Va. 2019). 
162 W. VA. CODE § 16A-3-1. 
163 H.B. 551 §§ 195.2150 (1)(2), 195.2159 (1) (Mo. 2019). 
164 H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-15(d),(f) (W. Va. 2019). 
165 H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-12 (W. Va. 2019). 
166 H.B. 356 § 4 (N.M. 2019). 
167 H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:22) (N.H. 2019). 
168 E.g., H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019); A.B. 1617 § 31 
(art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506 § 31 (art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527 § 31 
(art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040 § 31 (art. 11, § 180) (N.Y. 2017). 
169 E.g., S.B. 1509, pt. VV § 2 (art. 2, § 19) (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. § 5-30 (Ill. 2019). 
170 Pacula, et al., supra note 107, at 1022–23. We acknowledge that, in the U.S., state 
alcohol monopolies are the target of both ideological and economic criticism and face 
numerous political and practical challenges despite their demonstrated public health utility. 
See generally Robin Room, Alcohol Monopolies in the U.S.: Challenges and Opportunities, 
8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 509 (1987) (surveying the history of state alcohol monopolies and 
assessing challenges). Despite these challenges, we include market structure in our 
assessment of a public health approach to cannabis based on its demonstrated public health 
benefits in alcohol control. Contra Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 72–73 (noting that 
state cannabis monopolies and other non-commercial market structures might be beneficial 
but declining to include this element in proposed framework because it would not be 
practically feasible).  
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increased alcohol sales,171 including increased purchase frequency by 
younger drinkers.172 CDC’s Community Preventive Services Task Force 
specifically recommends against privatization of alcohol markets.173 While 
no U.S. states have yet adopted a state-run cannabis market (likely due in part 
to federal illegality), Uruguay has adopted this approach in their national 
legalization framework.174 
 
As in states that adopted legalization via initiative, most legislative 
proposals also adopt a for-profit, commercial structure. One notable 
exception, however, is New Mexico’s S.B. 577, which would create a state 
monopoly on sales.175 
 
3. Unitary Regulatory System 
 
Merging the regulatory structures for medical and adult use cannabis 
seeks to reduce regulatory complexity because complexity benefits larger 
business entities that have more extensive financial resources.176 A unitary 
system is also more transparent and more consistent with regulation of other 
products, few of which are regulated under bifurcated systems depending on 
how they are used.177 While tax rates and other aspects may differ between 
medical and adult use cannabis operations within a unitary market, entirely 
separate regulatory systems may encourage misuse of the medical system by 
either consumers or suppliers.178  The added complexity also makes 
enforcement of regulations more difficult, a particular problem in resource-
limited states. 
 
Some existing adult use states have merged their medical and adult use 
 
171 Alexander C. Wagenaar & Harold D. Holder, Changes in Alcohol Consumption 
Resulting from the Elimination of Retail Wine Monopolies: Results from Five U.S. States, 56 
J. STUD. ALCOHOL 566 (1995) (examining wine sales in five U.S. states following 
privatization of wine sales in those jurisdictions).  
172 William C. Kerr, et al., Changes in Spirits Purchasing Behaviours after Privatisation 
of Government-Controlled Sales in Washington, USA, 38 DRUG ALCOHOL REV. 294 (2019) 
(finding increased purchase frequency among drinkers 18-29 following market privatization 
in Washington State). 
173 Community Preventive Services Task Force, “CPSTF Findings for Excessive 
Alcohol Consumption” (2019), https://www.thecommunityguide.org/content/task-force-
findings-excessive-alcohol-consumption. 
174 Nick Miroff, In Uruguay's Marijuana Experiment, the Government is Your Pot 
Dealer, WASH. POST, July 7, 2017. 
175 S.B. 577 § 3(H) (N.M. 2019). 
176 Barry, et al., supra note 16, at 3. 
177 Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 82. 
178 Id.  
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regulatory systems.179 Proposed bills in New Jersey,180 New Mexico,181 
Rhode Island, 182Vermont,183 and West Virginia184 would similarly create 
unitary systems overseeing both medical and adult use cannabis regulation.  
 
In contrast, bills in Maryland,185 Minnesota,186 and West Virginia,187 
among others, would create new adult use regulatory frameworks without 
altering existing oversight of medical cannabis programs. By example, a New 
Jersey bill would create a new Division of Marijuana Enforcement in the 
Department of Law and Public Safety to oversee adult use cannabis 
regulation while leaving the state’s Department of Health in charge of 
regulating medical cannabis.188 Illinois’s enacted bill similarly leaves the 
state’s medical cannabis program intact, with conflicts between the new adult 
use law and the medical program as related to medical cannabis patients to 
be resolved in favor of the medical program’s provisions.189  
 
4. Exclusion of Industry from Formal Regulatory Roles 
 
As stated in the Implementing Guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO 
FCTC, “[t]here is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the 
tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”190 The WHO 
recognizes that the industry “sees itself as a legitimate stakeholder in tobacco 
 
179 See, e.g., Medicinal and Adult Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act, S.B. 94 (Cal. 
2017) § 1(g) (stating purposes of law, including single regulatory structure); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 69.50.375 (2018) (medical marijuana endorsement process for retail licensees). See 
also OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.025 (stating powers of Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 
including authority pursuant to statutes governing both adult use and medical cannabis); but 
see OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.949 (giving rulemaking authority over medical cannabis program 
to the Oregon health Authority). 
180 A.B. 4497 §§ 7–8 (N.J. 2018)(Cannabis Regulatory Commission); S.B. 2703 § 7 
(N.J. 2018)(Cannabis Regulatory Commission). 
181 H.B. 356 § 3(B) (N.M. 2019)(Cannabis Control Division). 
182 S.B. 2895 § 1(21-28.11-3) (R.I. 2017). 
183 H.B. 196 § 2 (tit. 7, § 841(b)(4)) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54 § 9 (tit.7, § 841(b)(4) (Vt. 2019). 
184 H.B. 2331 § 16A-17-6(a) (W.Va. 2019) (authorizing Bureau of Public Health to adopt 
implementing rules). The Bureau of Public Health oversees the state’s existing medical 
cannabis program. W. VA. CODE § 16A-3-1 (2017). 
185 H.B. 632 § 1 (art. XX § 2(B)(2)(IV)) (Md. 2019) (prohibiting regulations issued 
under new law from limiting licensure of businesses dealing only in medical cannabis). 
186 H.F. 465 §§ 2(subdiv. 1), 26 (Minn. 2019) (creating Bureau of Cannabis Oversight 
without altering authority of Commissioner of Health to regulate medical cannabis). 
187 H.B. 2376 § 11-16-A (W. Va. 2019) (defining “regulatory agency”); W. VA. CODE § 
16A-3-1 (2017). 
188 A.B. 3819 §§ 6, 22 (N.J. 2018). 
189 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 55-85(a) (Ill. 2019). 
190 WHO FCTC Guidelines, supra note 79, at 5, 22. 
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control and attempts to position itself as a legitimate partner,” but 
unequivocally concludes that the industry “is not and cannot be a partner in 
effective tobacco control.”191 Tobacco industry interference precipitates 
policies that are scientifically inaccurate and do not adequately protect public 
health,192 and the industry routinely presents misleading scientific 
evidence.193 
 
The cannabis industry is not the tobacco industry (at least not yet194), but 
the innate conflict between the cannabis industry’s interests and those of 
public health are no less concerning. Notwithstanding the potential medical 
applications of cannabis, which are not the focus of this analysis, adult use 
cannabis is a product with harmful health effects that can result in use 
disorders and dependence.195 Even in the absence of objectively bad 
corporate behavior like that of the tobacco industry, the cannabis industry’s 
profit-seeking orientation196 will ultimately lead to business strategies that 
increase demand and ensure continuing initiation of young consumers to 
replace those that stop using (whether by cessation or expiration).197 These 
 
191 WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE WITH TOBACCO 
CONTROL 5, 22 (2008), available at 
https://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/Tobacco%20Industry%20Interference-
FINAL.pdf. 
192 See, e.g., Stella A. Bialous & Derek Yach, Whose Standard Is It, Anyway? How the 
Tobacco Industry Determines the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
Standards for Tobacco and Tobacco Products, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 96 (2001). 
(discussing industry interference in setting international standards for tobacco products in 
the ISO). 
193 See, e.g., Selda Ulucanlar, et al., Representation and Misrepresentation of Scientific 
Evidence in Contemporary Tobacco Regulation: A Review of Tobacco Industry Submissions 
to the UK Government Consultation on Standardised Packaging, 11 PLOS MED. e1001629  
(2014) (discussing industry scientific evidence presented on standardized packaging in the 
United Kingdom). 
194 See generally Barry, et al., supra note 16. 
195 See Alan J. Budney, et al., An Update on Cannabis Use Disorder with Comment on 
the Impact of Policy Related to Therapeutic and Recreational Cannabis Use, 269 EUR. 
ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE  73 (2019); Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse,  
“Marijuana: Is marijuana addictive?” (2018), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/marijuana-addictive; 
Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, DSM-5 Diagnoses and New ICD-10-CM Codes (2017), available at 
http://www.acbhcs.org/providers/qa/docs/training/DSM-IV_DSM-5_SUD_DX.pdf. 
196 An exception would be a government-controlled monopoly or a not-for-profit 
restriction, as discussed supra. 
197 As the tobacco industry well understands, and explicitly stated in a confidential 
internal memorandum in the 1980s, “[y]ounger adults are the only source of replacement 
smokers.” Memorandum, R.J. Reynolds, The Importance of Younger Adults (Undated) at 
50341 8151 (available from Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, R.J. Reynolds Records,  
https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/jzyl0056). 
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interests are unalterably opposed to those of public health. 
 
Consequently, relations between the cannabis industry and regulatory 
agencies, advisory boards, and other entities should be limited to transparent, 
arms-length interactions. Among existing adult use states, Oregon has 
prohibited industry representatives from having formal policymaking roles, 
while Colorado and Alaska have allowed industry members to serve on 
advisory boards, and Alaska has even allowed two industry members to serve 
on a five-person committee to design the state’s regulatory system.198 
 
Most state proposals do not explicitly address industry participation in 
official regulatory bodies.199 Those that do take positions at both extremes. 
Three Minnesota bills would bar cannabis industry members from serving on 
the advisory council created under the bill.200 In stark contrast, a New Mexico 
bill would require a comparable advisory committee to include an industry 
representative.201 A New Hampshire bill would create an eleven-member 
advisory board with up to six positions potentially open to industry members, 
based on the description of expertise required.202 Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation reserves 1 of 24 positions on the newly created Adult Use 
Cannabis Health Advisory Committee for a representative of cannabis 
business licensees.203 
 
5. Local Control and Non-Preemption 
 
A well-crafted cannabis legal framework preserves the authority of local 
jurisdictions to regulate business operations within their borders in keeping 
with community needs and values. Local regulation is a cornerstone of public 
health law. While the federal government’s authority is supreme, state and 
local governments are closer to the people and typically better able to respond 
to the health needs of the community because of their “local knowledge, civic 
engagement, and direct political accountability.”204 Local government has 
more limited authority, and its authority is dependent largely on delegations 
 
198 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66, at 915. 
199 This does not include provisions addressing direct conflicts of interest for regulators. 
See generally, e.g., Bowling & Glantz, supra note 150; see also Barry & Glantz supra note 
66. 
200 H.F. 420 § 4, subdiv. 3 (Minn. 2019); H.F. 4541 § 3, subdiv. 2 (Minn. 2017); S.F. 
619 §4, subdiv. 3 (Minn. 2019). 
201 H.B. 356 § 3(E)(1) (N.M. 2019). 
202 H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:8(II)), 166th Sess., 1st Year (N.H. 2019).  
203 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(b)(23) (Ill. 2019). 
204 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 81 
(University of California Press 2nd ed. 2008).  
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of power under state law, but public health issues often place local officials 
on the “front line.”205 
 
Local jurisdictions have historically been leaders in advancing public 
health approaches to health hazards. This is particularly evident in the history 
of tobacco control. Local jurisdictions were the first to adopt smoking 
restrictions for workplaces and public places, building critical mass and 
political will for states to follow suit.206 Advancing state laws that include 
preemption of local regulatory action is a favored tactic of the tobacco 
industry for precisely this reason and creates a significant obstacle for 
tobacco control.207 Eliminating preemption of local tobacco control measures 
in state law remains a goal of health advocates,208 and nascent cannabis laws 
should avoid creating similar obstacles to local regulation. Preemption 
(specifically ceiling preemption) of local regulation can hinder beneficial 
public health action in situations where cross-jurisdictional uniformity is not 
necessary.209 
 
Existing legalizing states have generally preserved local authority to 
regulate cannabis businesses. Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington all 
authorize local jurisdictions to restrict or prohibit commercial cannabis 
operations within their borders (with Oregon requiring a general election 
referendum to do so).210 California also vests local governments with such 
control,211 though the boundaries of this authority remain in question to some 
extent and subject to litigation and political maneuvering.212  
 
 
205 JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 36–38 (West Academic 
Publishing. 2014). 
206 See generally Michael Siegel, et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control. Review of an 
Emerging Public Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858 (1997). 
207 U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, State Preemption of Local Ttobacco 
Control Policies Restricting Smoking, Advertising, and Youth Access--United States, 2000-
2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1124 (2011); Siegel, et al., supra note 206. 
208 U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., “Healthy People 2020 Topics & Objectives: 
Substance Use,” supra note 103. 
209 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., FOR THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH: REVITALIZING LAW AND POLICY 
TO MEET NEW CHALLENGES 48–52 (2011), available at 
https://www.nap.edu/read/13093/chapter/1#ii.  
210 Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 77. 
211 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26200(a) (2016). 
212 Ongoing litigation addresses whether localities have the authority to prohibit 
cannabis deliveries within their borders. Blood, supra note 65. A 2019 state legislative 
proposal would also require localities that voted in favor of the state’s 2016 legalization 
initiative to issue a number retail cannabis licenses equal to 25% of active alcoholic beverage 
sales licenses in the jurisdiction. A.B. 1356, 2019 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2019). 
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Proposed bills generally would give localities authority to limit or 
prohibit operation of cannabis business within their jurisdiction. As presented 
in Table 1, bills that explicitly address this issue preserve local authority to 
prohibit at least some classes of cannabis business entities within their 
borders, and the majority allow localities to completely prohibit cannabis 
operations. 
 
Table 1: Local Control and Non-Preemption Provisions in Proposed Bills 
Type State Bills 
Total local 
prohibition 
authorized 
 
Arizona S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (4-410)213 
Connecticut 
 
H.B. 5458 § 11 
S.B. 487 § 17 
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 16 
Maryland H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX (2)(C) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 § 16 
H.F. 4541 § 4 
Missouri H.B. 551 § A (195.2156) 
New Hampshire H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:11) 
New Jersey 
 
A.B. 3581 § 12(b) 
A.B. 3819 §11(c) 
S.B. 2702 § 12(b) 
S.B. 2703 § 20(b) 
New York 
 
A.B. 1617 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) 
A.B. 3506 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) 
S.B. 1527 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) 
S.B. 3040 § 15 (221.05-a)214 
Vermont 
 
H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 863) 
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 863) 
Virginia 
 
H.B. 2371 art. 3 § 3.2-4145 
H.B. 2373 art. 3 § 3.2-4150 
West Virginia H.B. 2331 §§  16A-17-4, -6(c)215  
 
213The Arizona proposal is a legislative concurrent resolution calling for a citizen 
referendum. S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (Ariz. 2019). While referenda and initiatives are often 
grouped together because they both subject policymaking to popular vote, a key difference 
is that referenda originate in the legislature before submission to voters. As a result, we treat 
this referendum as a legislative form of legalization for purposes of this article. 
214 The bill would allow localities to prohibit commercial operations, but not to prohibit 
personal cultivation. S.B. 3040 § 15(2) (N.Y. 2017). 
215 This bill provides for a county-level election to allow cannabis production and sales, 
with additional municipal-level regulation of the operation, location, and number of cannabis 
establishments. 
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Total local 
prohibition 
authorized, with 
restrictions 
 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 55-25 (may prohibit, 
but may not regulate more 
restrictively than state law) 
New Mexico 
S.B. 577 §§ 7–8 (may not allow and 
then later prohibit)216 
Rhode Island 
S.B. 2895 § 1 (21-28.11-10) (must 
pass individual referendum for each 
class of establishment) 
Partial local 
prohibition 
authorized 
 
New Hampshire 
H.B. 722 § 7 (does not include 
growing/harvesting) 
New Mexico 
H.B. 356 § 11(A)(3) (may prohibit 
retail cannabis product sales, but not 
personal production or medical-only 
sellers) 
 
6. Revenue Allocation 
 
It is essential that revenues from cannabis regulation and taxation fully 
cover, at minimum, the costs of administering and enforcing regulatory 
structures established to oversee the new market. Ideally, revenues should 
also cover reasonably anticipated economic externalities, including future 
health costs, though these are difficult to quantify in advance, particularly 
given the current state of scientific evidence regarding the effects of cannabis 
use. An appropriate model for estimating these costs may be to base the 
estimates on the effects of comparable levels of tobacco use (which are 
presently higher than cannabis use). Tobacco represents an historic failure to 
address such externalities. Tobacco use imposes massive costs on healthcare 
systems, but it was not until the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) 
that states began to recover costs to their public health systems from smoking-
related illnesses and death.217 Despite large influxes of revenue from the 
MSA, states have continued to direct less than 1% of these funds to tobacco 
prevention programs and to fund such efforts at levels far below those 
recommended by the CDC, stymying their effectiveness.218 
 
The health effects of cannabis use are not yet well understood, making 
 
216 As noted supra, this bill creates a state-operated sales monopoly. 
217 Pub. Health Law Ctr., “The Master Settlement Agreement: An Overview” 1–2 
(2018), https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-
2018.pdf. 
218 Id. at 8;  Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, “Actual Annual Tobacco Settlement 
Payments Received by the States, 1998-2010,” 2019, 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf. 
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projections of future health costs challenging. Analogies to other substances, 
such as tobacco, are useful but incomplete because cannabis use patterns 
differ and appear to be in flux. For example, as of 2017 dried flower remained 
the most commonly used cannabis product and had the most direct parallels 
to tobacco use, but cannabis edibles and other consumption methods were 
growing in popularity.219 Given the uncertainty of other costs, cannabis 
revenues should fund continuing research efforts to better understand the 
impact of legalization, including health effects, to avoid the accumulation of 
substantial unfunded costs as has occurred for tobacco. Cannabis revenue 
allocation (and underlying taxation levels) should adapt to this new evidence 
as it develops. 
 
However, using cannabis revenues for other purposes is politically 
attractive. For example, Colorado legalization advocates made education 
funding via cannabis revenues a centerpiece of campaign advertisements in 
2012.220 State budgets also tend to absorb funds that are not earmarked for 
specific purposes, as has often been the case for tobacco revenues.221 
However, there is also some risk in directing cannabis revenues exclusively 
to cannabis-related programs if regulatory agencies become dependent on the 
sales of the substance they regulate.222 
 
Of the first four legalizing states, only Washington dedicated a portion of 
revenue to funding a continuous research program, though health 
departments in the other three states subsequently acted to support such 
efforts with existing funding sources or sought to obtain new funds.223 Later 
legalizing states, for example California, earmarked some annual funding for 
research, enforcement, and youth prevention, among other purposes.224 
 
As described in Table 2, state proposals take dramatically different 
 
219 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 52. 
220 Matt Ferner, Marijuana Legalization TV Ad Says: ‘Let’s Have Marijuana Tax Money 
Go To Our Schools Rather Than Criminals’, HUFFPOST, October 4, 2012. 
221  Kerry Cork, Public Health Law Center, “Toking, Smoking, and Public Health: 
Lessons from Tobacco Control for Marijuana Regulation” 8 (2018), available at 
http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/Toking-Smoking-Public-
Health-2018.pdf. 
222 ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 114, at 91–93. 
223 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66, at 916. 
224 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 34019(b)–(h). However, as of July 2019, cannabis 
revenues have been far lower than initial projections and consumed by enforcement costs. 
As a result, no earmarked state funds for other programs have yet been distributed, though 
some localities have used local cannabis revenues for a variety of programs. See Lisa M. 
Krieger, Where Does California's Cannabis Tax Money Go? You Might Be Surprised., 
MERCURY NEWS, May 25, 2019. 
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approaches to revenue allocation. Many appropriately set aside funds first to 
cover administration and enforcement. Some bills direct remaining funds 
primarily to cannabis-related programs, including public education, drug 
treatment, intoxicated driving prevention, mental health services, and 
cannabis research. However, other bills dedicate substantial revenues to other 
purposes, including infrastructure, business development, and state general 
funds. 
 
Legislatures are at times plain in their intention to generate significant 
revenue from cannabis. For example, a Hawaii bill includes a provision 
stating, “The legislature finds that it is high time Hawaii begins to reap the 
revenue benefits from taxing adult cannabis use.”225 Similarly, several New 
York bills would explicitly require the responsible agency to regularly review 
tax rates and recommend changes to further three purposes: “maximizing net 
revenue,” minimizing illegal industry, and discouraging underage use.226 
 
Table 2: Revenue Allocation in Proposed Bills 
State Bill Selected Revenue Allocation 
Provisions 
Arizona S.C. Res. 1022 § 
2 (art. 10, § 42-
5453(C)) 
40% to general fund, 40% to public 
education grants, 20% to drug treatment 
and rehabilitation 
Hawaii H.B. 1581 § 2 
(19) 
Revenues first to implementation and 
enforcement, with excess to county 
infrastructure projects (50%) and local 
farm development grants (50%) 
Illinois H.B. 902 § 85 After implementation and enforcement 
costs: 50% to general fund; 30% to 
State Board of Education; 5% to 
voluntary alcohol, tobacco, and 
cannabis abuse treatment programs; 5% 
to Department of Public Health for 
public education campaign targeting 
youth and adults; 2.5% to state 
employee retirement system; 2.5% to 
teachers’ retirement system; 2.%% to 
state university retirement system; 2.5% 
to state police for drug recognition 
 
225 H.B. 1581 § 1 (Haw. 2019). 
226 A.B. 1617 § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506 § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) 
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527 § 3 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040 § 33 (art. 18-A § 
447(3)) (N.Y. 2017). 
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experts 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1348 § 900-
15 (adding § 6z-
107(c)(3)) 
Revenues first to administrative and 
enforcement costs, with remainder 
allocated 35% to general fund, 25% to 
criminal justice reform program, 20% 
for substance abuse and prevention and 
mental health, 10% for budget 
stabilization, 8% to local crime 
prevention programs relating to illicit 
cannabis and driving under the 
influence, and 2% to public education 
campaign 
Kentucky S.B. 80 §§ 18(4), 
19, 20(3) 
80% to statewide fund distributed 95% 
to offset costs of program 
administration and enforcement, with 
remainder to substance abuse treatment 
programs (1%), public education (1%), 
and law enforcement training (3%); 
20% to local funds in jurisdictions with 
cannabis businesses 
Minnesota H.F. 420 § 18; 
S.F. 619 § 18 
$10 million annually to small businesses 
as part of a social justice program; 
remaining revenues 60% to the state’s 
general fund, 10% to mental health, 10% 
to police training, 10% to department of 
health research, 10% to education and 
public health programs 
Minnesota H.F. 465 § 25 Revenues first to administration, then 
40% mental health services, 40% early 
childhood education, and 20% to health 
department for education and public 
health program 
Missouri H.B. 551 § A 
(195.2162(2)) 
Revenues primarily to the state’s general 
fund 
New 
Mexico 
H.B. 356 § 54 Revenues support cannabis regulation 
fund, community grants reinvestment 
fund, cannabis health and safety fund, 
cannabis research fund, and local DWI 
grant program 
New York A.B. 1617 § 32; 
A.B. 3506 § 32; 
S.B. 1527 § 32;  
$1 million to revolving loan fund for 
licensees and microbusinesses; $1 
million to state university to research 
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S.B. 3040 § 32 
 
and evaluate implementation and effects 
of law, including public health impacts; 
$750,000 for license tracking and 
reporting; $750,000 to track and report 
violations of remaining cannabis laws; 
remaining funds to state lottery fund 
(25%), drug treatment education fund 
25%), and community grants 
reinvestment fund (50%) 
Virginia H.B. 2371, art. 6 
§ 3.2-4155(C) 
67% to general fund; 33% to retail 
marijuana education support fund to be 
used exclusively for public education 
Virginia H.B. 2373, art. 5 
§ 3.2-4158(D) 
$20 million to Veterans Treatment 
Fund; remainder 30% to localities with 
cannabis businesses, 35% to general 
fund for Standards of Quality basic aid 
payments, 35% to highway 
maintenance and operation fund 
West 
Virginia 
H.B. 3129 § 5B-
8-13 
Revenues in excess of operating costs 
toto teacher compensation and public 
employee insurance (25%), 
infrastructure (35%), law enforcement 
and community fund (15%), small 
business fund for grants/loans (15%), 
and public employee retirement system 
(10%, up to $2 million with excess to 
general fund) 
 
7. Enforcement and Liability 
 
Unannounced compliance checks, including those using underage decoy 
buyers, are a key component of effectively enforcing retailer compliance 
regarding sales to minors. Existing evidence from tobacco and alcohol 
control indicates that active, frequent enforcement utilizing escalating 
penalties, up to and including license revocation, is appropriate and effective 
to influence retailer behavior and reduce sales to minors.227 In contrast, the 
absence of compliance testing and penalties for violation limits the 
 
227  See, e.g., Lindsay F. Stead & Tim Lancaster, A Systematic Review of Interventions 
for Preventing Tobacco Sales to Minors, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 169, 175 (2000) (regarding 
tobacco); U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Enhanced Enforcement of Laws to 
Prevent Alcohol Sales to Underage Persons--New Hampshire, 1999-2004, 53 MORBIDITY 
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 452 (2004) (regarding alcohol). 
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effectiveness of state laws prohibiting sales to minors.228 To counter the 
potential for adult use markets to increase youth access and the appeal of 
cannabis to youth, maintaining high retailer compliance is crucial.229 
 
Among the first four adult use states, Washington provides for an 
unannounced compliance check program, but Alaska, Colorado, and Oregon 
do not.230 Compliance reviews in Washington and Colorado in the early 
stages of legalization found overall high levels of compliance by retailers 
(88% and 91%, respectively).231 
 
Several proposed bills do not specifically provide for license revocation 
for sales to minors, but leave establishment of grounds and procedures for 
license revocation to future regulations.232 Some bills do provide for specific 
penalties for sales to minors. For example, multiple New Jersey bills would 
penalize employees or agents of a licensee with increasing civil penalties up 
to $1,000 per violation and potentially result in revocation of the licensee’s 
license following a hearing.233 Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation authorizes 
random and unannounced inspections by regulators and state and local law 
enforcement,234 and provides for broad license suspension and revocation 
powers for violations generally,235 but does not explicitly apply these 
penalties to sales to minors.236 
  
Civil liability for retailers provides additional, indirect regulation on the 
behavior of commercial actors. Borrowed from alcohol service, commercial 
host or “dram shop” liability (sometimes called “gram shop liability” for 
cannabis237) is retailer liability for injuries resulting from overservice or 
 
228  J. R. DiFranza & G. F. Dussault, The Federal Initiative to Halt the Sale of Tobacco 
to Children--the Synar Amendment, 1992-2000: Lessons Learned, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 
93, 97 (2005). 
229 See, e.g., Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 80; Barry & Glantz, supra note 66. 
230 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66 
231 Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 80. 
232 E.g., H.F. 420 §§ 4 (subdiv. 2), 6 (subdiv. 5) (Minn. 2019); H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-11(c)(1) 
(W. Va. 2019); S.B. 577 § 3(G)(1) (N.M. 2019); H.B. 250 § 7(tit. 7, § 882) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 
196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 882) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 902 § 45(a)(1) (Ill. 2019). 
233 S.B. 2702 § (6)(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819 § 5(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3581 § 6(b) (N.J. 
2018). 
234 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 15-135 (Ill. 2019). 
235 Id. § 45-5. 
236 See id. §§ 10-20 (regarding identification). 
237 Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop 
Laws to protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 
B.C. L. REV. 863 (2017); Hayley Dean, Through the Haze: Fashioning a Workable Model 
for Imposing Civil Liability on Marijuana Vendors, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 611 (2014). 
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underage service and is a well-established but non-universal principle of state 
statutory tort law that relies primarily on deterrence effects.238 Thirty states 
have statutes imposing civil liability on establishments that sell or serve 
alcohol to individuals whose intoxication results in harms; twenty-two 
restrict liability to service of obviously intoxicated persons or persons under 
the legal drinking age.239 Dram shop liability laws are associated with 
reductions in alcohol consumption and fatal crash ratios.240 
 
Despite the prevalence of dram shop liability laws nationally, none of the 
reviewed bills included provisions explicitly detailing retailer liability for 
cannabis. However, other state statutory or case law may impose such 
liability. 
 
B.  Consumer-Facing Product and Retailer Regulation 
 
1. Packaging and Labeling 
 
A comprehensive public health approach to warning labels for cannabis 
and cannabis products should include evidence-based, effective measures 
from global tobacco control, such as plain packaging, graphic warning labels, 
and rotating health messaging.241 However, states may ultimately address 
these elements by rule rather than statute. 
 
a. Packaging  
 
Packaging is fundamentally a marketing tool, one that other industries, 
including tobacco and alcohol, have used to great effect. As with these 
products, branding on cannabis products offers the industry a secondary 
 
238 Berch, supra note 237, at 885; Frank A. Sloan, et al., Liability, Risk Perceptions, and 
Precautions at Bars, 43 J. L. & ECON. 473 (2000). 
239 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal 
Penalty State Statutes” (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-
commerce/dram-shop-liability-state-statutes.aspx. 
240 Michael Scherer, et al., Effects of Dram Shop, Responsible Beverage Service 
Training, and State Alcohol Control Laws on Underage Drinking Driver Fatal Crash Ratios, 
16 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION S59 (2015). Some scholars, notably Berch, propose gram 
shop laws not only for legalizing states, but also non-legalizing states that border them, with 
the aim of holding cannabis sellers accountable for injuries caused by consumers who travel 
or return to the non-legalizing neighbor state, Jessica Berch, Weed Wars: Winning the Fight 
Against Marijuana Spillover from Neighboring States, 19 NEV. L.J. 1 (2018); Berch, supra 
note 237, a proposition beyond the scope of this paper. 
241 DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN & STANTON A. GLANTZ, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 
RES. AND EDUC., PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE FOR RECREATIONAL CANNABIS LAWS, 
available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05d5g5db. 
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marketing opportunity to make up for other venues that may be legally 
restricted.242 
 
Plain packaging, devoid of all branding elements other than the brand 
name and product variant in plain text and specified font, is one of the most 
important and effective advances in tobacco control. Plain packaging 
improves the effectiveness of warnings, reduces product appeal to 
adolescents and young adults, and increases attention and perception of harm, 
among other benefits.243 While existing adult use states have not adopted 
plain packaging requirements,244 Oregon allows producers and 
manufacturers to bypass labeling and packaging approval if they use pre-
approved, generic labels and packaging,245 effectively creating an opt-in plain 
packaging approach. Outside the U.S., Canada246 and Uruguay247 have 
adopted plain packaging provisions as part of their national adult use 
cannabis legalization frameworks. 
 
Two Minnesota bills would require minimalist packaging that includes 
most elements of a plain packaging standard, prohibiting product depiction, 
cartoons, and any images other than the company logo or name.248 (The 
allowance for a logo is the only departure from a comprehensive plain 
packaging standard.) Like many other states’ proposed or enacted laws, this 
 
242 See, e.g., id. at 7–8. 
243 Melanie Wakefield, et al., Australian Adult Smokers’ Responses to Plain Packaging 
with Larger Graphic Health Warnings 1 Year after Implementation: Results from a National 
Cross-sectional Tracking Survey, 24 TOBACCO CONTROL ii17 (2015); P. Beede & R. 
Lawson, The Effect of Plain Packages on the Perception of Cigarette Health Warnings, 106 
PUB. HEALTH 315 (1992); Victoria White, et al., Has the Introduction of Plain Packaging 
with Larger Graphic Health Warnings Changed Adolescents’ Perceptions of Cigarette 
Packs and Brands?, 24 TOBACCO CONTROL ii42 (2015); Daniella Germain, et al., 
Adolescents’ Perceptions of Cigarette Brand Image: Does Plain Packaging Make a 
Difference?, 46 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 385 (2010); Ingeborg Lund & Janne Scheffels, 
Young Smokers and Non-smokers Perceptions of Typical Users of Plain vs. Branded 
Cigarette Packs: A Between-subjects Experimental Survey, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1005 
(2013); Crawford Moodie, et al., Young Adult Smokers’ Perceptions of Plain Packaging: A 
Pilot Naturalistic Study, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 367 (2011); Emily Brennan, et al., Mass 
Media Campaigns Designed to Support New Pictorial Health Warnings on Cigarette 
Packets: Evidence of a Complementary Relationship, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 412 (2011); 
Judith McCool, et al., Graphic Warning Labels on Plain Cigarette Packs: Will They Make a 
Difference to Adolescents?, 74 SOC. SCI. MED. 1269 (2012). 
244 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66, at Supplemental Table A. 
245 OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-7060.  
246 Cannabis Regulations SOR/2018-144 §§ 111–121 (Can). 
247 See Miroff, supra note 174. 
248 H.F. 420 § 13 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619 § 13 (Minn. 2019). 
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bill would also require the packaging to be opaque and child-resistant.249 
 
Several bills have packaging restrictions that target attempts to appeal to 
youth, but they often use broad, vague language. Two Vermont bills would 
prohibit packaging that makes a cannabis product more appealing to 
children.250 Two New Mexico bills would prohibit packaging that is 
“designed to be appealing to a child.”251 A Hawaii bill would require future 
regulations to prohibit “the use of any images designed or likely to appeal to 
minors, such as cartoons, toys, animals, or children; and any other likeness 
of images, characters, or phrases that are popularly used to advertise to 
children.”252 Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation contains a nearly identical 
provision, but adds a prohibition on “any packaging or labeling that bears 
reasonable resemblance to any product available for consumption as a 
commercially available candy.”253 
 
A Virginia bill uses particularly weak language with respect to packaging, 
prohibiting products labeled or packaged “in a manner that is specifically 
designed to appeal particularly to persons under 21.”254 Manufacturers could 
easily escape culpability under such a standard by arguing that they design 
their packaging to appeal to lawful young adult consumers (i.e., 21 and over) 
and that any appeal to underage consumers is unintentional. One need look 
no further than the online marketing tactics of e-cigarette maker JUUL Labs 
Inc. (now partially owned by Philip Morris USA parent company Altria) and 
the company’s subsequent statements to see how an industry may deploy 
such a defense to parry accusations of inappropriately targeting youth.255 
 
249 H.F. 420 § 13 (Minn. 2019). It would also require packaging to be recyclable or 
reusable if such materials are available, id., an important environmental public health 
consideration, particularly in light of serious environmental pollution harms from tobacco 
products. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: AN 
OVERVIEW 24–28 (2017), available at 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/255574/9789241512497-
eng.pdf;jsessionid=A3D1E3A7AB57F0836E0E64DBF2B1CD2B?sequence=1. 
250 H.B. 250 § 7 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F) 
(Vt. 2019). 
251  S.B. 577 § 12(B) (N.M. 2019); H.B. 356 § 17(B) (N.M. 2019). 
252 H.B. 1581 § 11(16) (Haw. 2019). 
253 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 55-21(f)(5) (Ill. 2019). 
254 Virginia H.B. 2373 art. 4 § 3.2-4155(C)(2) (emphasis added). 
255 See Press Release, Kevin Burns, CEO, JUUL Labs, JUUL Labs Action Plan  (Nov. 
13, 2018) (defending the company and arguing that their “intent was never to have youth use 
JUUL products”); but see ROBERT K. JACKLER, ET AL., STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 
MEDICINE, JUUL ADVERTISING OVER ITS FIRST THREE YEARS ON THE MARKET, STANFORD 
RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING 1, available at 
http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/publications/JUUL_Marketing_Stanford.pdf 
(concluding based on content analysis that “JUUL’s advertising imagery in its first 6 months 
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b. Warning Labels 
 
Warning labels have demonstrated efficacy in tobacco control, 
influencing risk perceptions, health knowledge, motivation to quit, and 
appeal to youth. Warnings are most effective when they are large, 
prominently positioned, clearly worded, periodically changed to reduce 
familiarity, and designed to include pictorial content in addition to text.256 
 
As of July 2019, none of the existing adult use states required a warning 
label with pictorial content like that of tobacco graphic warning labels, 
though some do require a small (likely ineffective) warning symbol for 
cannabis products.257 Similarly, none of the proposed bills include specific 
requirements for rotating health warnings or pictorial content. However, 
many bills would vest decision-making authority for package warnings in one 
or more regulatory bodies,258 meaning these entities could potentially adopt 
such requirements. 
 
For example, four New Jersey bills would require a warning label to 
“adequately inform consumers about safe marijuana use and warn of the 
consequences of misuse or overuse.”259 A New Mexico bill would require 
labels that warn of potential adverse effects.260 Six New York bills would 
authorize the responsible agency to seek the assistance of the state health 
 
on the market was patently youth oriented. For the next 2 ½ years it was more muted, but the 
company’s advertising was widely distributed on social media channels frequented by youth, 
was amplified by hashtag extensions, and catalyzed by compensated influencers and 
affiliates.”).  
256 See ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 241, at 12–16 (summarizing existing evidence 
from tobacco control and application to cannabis). 
257 See, e.g., CA. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 40412 (2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 333-007-020 
(2018); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1 (2018); Memorandum, James Burack, Director, 
Marijuana Enforcement Division, Colorado Department of Revenue, Re: Adoption of a 
Single Universal Symbol for Medical and Retail Marijuana, available at 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/IB%2018-
04%20Universal%20Symbol%20Rules.pdf; Oregon Health Authority, “Cannabis Universal 
Symbol,” 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PreventionWellness/marijuana/Pages/symbol.aspx, last 
accessed May 30, 2019; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-106 (2018). 
258 S.B. 80 § 11(3)(f) (Ky.  2019); H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 250 § 
7 (tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); A.B. 3581 § 9(a)((7) 
(N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819 § 8(a)(7) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497 § 16(a)(7) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 577 § 
3(E) (N.M.  2019); A.B. 1617 § 181 (N.Y. 2019). 
259 A.B. 3819 § 8(a)(7)(c) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497 § 16(a)(7)(c) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2703 § 
16(a)(7)(c) (N.J. 2018).  
260 H.B. 356 § 17(C)(6) (N.M. 2019). 
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department in developing regulations for warning labels including “any 
potential impact on human health resulting from the consumption of 
marihuana products . . . if such labels are deemed warranted.”261  
 
Bills that do specify warning content tend to include minimal warnings 
similar to existing alcohol warning labels, which are the product of a 
voluntary code and do not appear to be particularly effective.262 These types 
of warning labels address only specific populations (e.g., children, pregnant 
women), use by minors, or driving while intoxicated.263 Some are even more 
basic, such as a West Virginia bill that would simply require a warning that 
the product is intoxicating and to keep it away from children.264 
 
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation charges the state’s Department of 
Public Health with defining and updating health warnings for cannabis, but 
also includes specific warning language to be used unless modified by rule. 
Among other label content, the bill requires all cannabis products to include 
a statement that “use can impair cognition and may be habit forming” and 
requires cannabis that may be smoked to include the statement, “Smoking is 
hazardous to your health.”265 While there are no requirements for pictorial or 
rotating elements in the legislation and some of the specified language does 
not reflect best practices, these are nonetheless a rare example of health-
specific cannabis warnings. 
 
2. Product Taxes 
 
Taxes on products like tobacco and alcohol are an effective means of 
decreasing consumption, particularly among adolescents, who are generally 
more price-sensitive.266 However, the existence of a robust illicit market for 
 
261 A.B. 1617 § 31 (art. 11 § 181(4)) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 2009 art. 4 § 78(3) (N.Y. 2019), 
A.B. 3506 § 181(4) (N.Y. 2017_); S.B. 1509 § 78(3) (N.Y. 2019), S.B. 1527 § 181(4) (N.Y. 
2019); S.B. 3040 § 180(4) (N.Y. 2017). 
262 Barry & Glantz, supra note 66, at 919. 
263 See, e.g., S.B. 2895 § 1(21-28.11-8(d)(4)) (R.I. 2017); H.B. 2371 art. 4 § 3.2-
4149(A)(9) (Va. 2018); H.B. 2373 art. 4 § 3.2-4155(A)(9) (Va. 2018); S.B. 2702 § 
(9)(a)(7)(d)(viii). 
264 H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-12 (W.V. 2019). 
265 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 55-21(i)–(j) (Ill. 2019). 
266 See, e.g., Summer S. Hawkins, et al., Impact of Tobacco Control Policies on 
Adolescent Smoking, 58 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 679 (2016) (finding most price sensitivity 
among youngest adolescents with respect to cigarettes); Michael F. Pesko, et al., E-cigarette 
Price Sensitivity among Middle- and High-school Students: Evidence from Monitoring the 
Future, 113 ADDICTION 896 (2018) (finding price sensitivity among adolescents for e-
cigarettes); Xin Xu & Frank J. Chaloupka, The Effects of Prices on Aalcohol Use and Its 
Consequences, 34 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 236, 239–40 (2011) (discussing studies that 
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cannabis is distinguishing and requires a balanced approach in which taxes 
are high enough to discourage abuse and youth use, but low enough to 
establish a stable legal market.267 While the public health approach distinctly 
prioritizes health interests over commercial interests, the legal market does 
have public health benefits over the illicit market with respect to age 
restriction, labeling, and product testing, among other areas. Experimentation 
among implementing jurisdictions will likely be necessary to identify 
characteristics of the supply and demand curves for legal cannabis and 
establish an ideal level of tax, which may also change as the legal market 
takes hold.  
 
As shown in Table 3, state proposals would take a variety of approaches 
to taxation. Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation is notable not only because it 
was the only proposed bill to pass as of July 2019, but also because of its 
unique taxation approach. The legislation differentiates among cannabis 
products by THC content, taxing more potent products at a rate more than 
double that of lower-potency products (25% sales tax on products over 35% 
THC compared to 10% tax on products at or below that threshold) and also 
distinguishes between infused products and other product categories.268 
 
Table 3: Tax Rates in Proposed Bills 
State Bill(s) Selected Provisions 
Escalating sales/excise tax with defined increase 
New Jersey A.B. 3581 § 11(a) 
7% sales tax, escalating over 5 years 
to 15% 
New Jersey A.B. 3819 § 10(a) 
7% sales tax, escalating over 5 years 
to 25% 
New Jersey S.B. 2702  § 11 
10% excise tax, escalating to 25% 
in 4 years; includes prevailing sales 
tax 
Escalating sales/excise tax with undefined adjustment 
Illinois H.B. 902 § 80 
10% excise tax to be adjusted 
annually for inflation 
New 
Hampshire 
H.B. 481 § 8 (77-
H:2(I)) 
$30 per ounce of flower; $10 per 
ounce of other plant material; $15 
 
consistently demonstrate inverse relationship between price and alcohol consumption among 
adolescents and youth). 
267 See, e.g., Mark A. R. Kleiman, We're Legalizing Weed Wrong, SLATE, Nov. 7, 2016, 
available at : 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/11/america_is_legalizing_marijuan
a_wrong.html. 
268 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 65-10(a) (Ill. 2019). 
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per immature plant; adjusted for 
inflation 
New York 
A.B. 1617 § 33; 
A.B. 3506 § 33; 
S.B. 1527 § 33; 
S.B. 3040 § 33 
$0.62 per gram of flower and $0.10 
per gram of leaves cultivation tax; 
$1.35 per immature plant nursery 
tax; 15% excise tax on all 
nonmedical purchases; rates to be 
adjusted every 2 years according to 
cost-of-living adjustment and to be 
regularly reviewed; local tax up to 
2% 
Sales/excise tax > 10% 
Hawaii S.B. 686 § 2(329-I) 15% excise tax 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 65-10 
25% excise tax on cannabis over 
35% THC; 10% tax on cannabis at 
or below 35% THC; 20% tax on 
cannabis-infused products 
Minnesota 
H.F. 465 §§ 1 
(subdiv. 2), 3, 12 
15% gross revenues of processor; 
12% gross receipts from retail sales 
and lounge admission; optional 3% 
local tax 
Missouri 
H.B. 551 § A 
(195.2162)   
20% at transfer from cultivator; 
additional local taxes allowed 
Vermont 
H.B. 196 § 16 (tit. 
32, §§ 7901–02) 
11% excise tax; optional 3% local 
tax 
West 
Virginia 
H.B. 2331 § 16A-
17-7(a) 
15% excise tax; optional 5% local 
tax 
West 
Virginia 
H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-
13 
17.5% excise tax; optional 6% local 
tax 
Sales/excise tax ≤ 10% 
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 20(2) 
Excise tax 10% on flower, 5% on 
other plant parts, 8% on immature 
plants; additional sales tax permitted 
but not specified 
New 
Hampshire 
H.B. 722 § 2 8% sales tax 
New Jersey 
A.B. 4497 §§ 18(a), 
19(a) 
 
5.375% on receipts from retail sale 
in addition to existing sales tax; 
additional local tax up to 2% 
New Jersey 
S.B. 2703 §§ 18(a), 
19(a) 
5.375% in addition to state sales and 
use tax; optional 2% local tax 
New H.B. 356 §§ 48–50 9% excise tax (none on medial); up 
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Mexico to 3% municipal tax; up to 3% 
county tax 
New 
Mexico 
S.B. 577 §§ 33–34 
4% state excise tax; optional 4% 
municipal tax; optional 4% county 
tax 
Vermont 
S.B. 54 § 14 (tit. 32, 
§ 7901–02); H.B. 
250 § 14 (tit. 32, § 
7901–02) 
10% excise tax; 1% optional local 
tax 
Virginia 
H.B. 2373 art. 5 §§ 
3.2-4158–59 
10% sales tax; optional 5% local tax 
Virginia 
H.B. 2371  
§§ 3.2-4155(A),  
3.2-4156(A) 
9.7%; optional 5% local tax 
 
 
3. Product Access 
 
Unlike tobacco (and in many states alcohol), adult use cannabis is (so far) 
sold only in age-restricted venues. Provided this restriction remains in place 
and subject to active and comprehensive enforcement, it alleviates some 
product access concerns. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009 prohibited tobacco vending machines and self-service 
displays outside of adult-only facilities.269 However, access restrictions 
address more than youth use. Total prohibitions on tobacco vending machines 
in all locations are associated with reduced smoking propensity, with those 
who live in an area with a total prohibition less likely to smoke.270 
 
Three Vermont bills would prohibit any direct customer access to 
cannabis products in a retail shop and require all products to be stored behind 
a counter or similar barrier.271 Two Virginia bills would prohibit vending 
machines, drive-through windows, and internet-based sales platforms, among 
other restrictions.272 Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly prohibits 
drive-through windows and vending machines.273 In contrast, two bills in 
 
269 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,  123 Stat. 1776 (2009); 21 
C.F.R. § 1140.16(c).  
270 Mike Vuolo, et al., Impact of Total Vending Machine Restrictions on US Young Adult 
Smoking, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 2092 (2016). 
271 H.B. 250 § 2(881)(4)(B) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(4)(B)) (Vt. 2019); 
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § (881)(4)(B)) (Vt. 2019). 
272 H.B. 2371 art. 3 § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(a)(Va. 2018); H.B. 2373 art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(a) 
(Va. 2018). 
273 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-65(n)(7)–(8) (Ill. 2019). 
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Hawaii would explicitly allow operation of vending machines.274 
 
There is some debate as to public health best practices with respect to 
allowing product delivery. Deliveries are difficult to regulate275 and increase 
the risk of illegal youth access, particularly given the inadequacy of most age 
verification approaches.276 However, Health Canada acknowledged an 
advantage to some cannabis delivery models in that their discretion 
(compared to more visible brick-and-mortar retail outlets) may not encourage 
increased usage.277 The Canadian Public Health Association also expressed 
concern that storefront retailers could stimulate increased product variety and 
noted that a delivery-only system (as Canada operated for its medical 
cannabis program) “eliminates the likelihood of placement of shops near 
areas where children congregate, and concerns regarding signage and 
advertising for such shops.”278  
 
Combined with the risk that storefront retailer concentration may 
normalize and increase use (based on evidence from tobacco and alcohol 
control279), cannabis delivery may offer both benefits and risks for public 
health, and a total prohibition on delivery may not ultimately be ideal. 
However, age verification processes would require substantial improvement 
in order to realize potential benefits while mitigating risks. As with many 
other open questions regarding cannabis regulation, as evidence develops it 
will be far easier to liberalize an overly restrictive policy than to attempt to 
eliminate an established facet of the market.  
 
Of those bills that explicitly address delivery, seven bills in four states 
would prohibit it, while sixteen bills in nine states would permit it, as noted 
in Table 4, below. 
 
 
274 H.B. 1515 § 2(712)(3) (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779 § 2(712)(3) (Haw. 2019). 
275 Barry & Glantz, supra note 142, at 5. 
276 See Rebecca S. Williams & Kurt M. Ribisl, Internet Alcohol Sales to Minors, 166 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 808 (2012) (finding that age verification by 
internet alcohol vendors failed to prevent sales to minors in 45% of study cases and that 59% 
of vendors used weak or no age verification). 
277 HEALTH CANADA, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF 
CANNABIS IN CANADA (2016), available at https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-
sc/healthy-canadians/migration/task-force-marijuana-groupe-etude/framework-
cadre/alt/framework-cadre-eng.pdf. 
278 Canadian Public Health Association, “A Public Health Approach to the Legalization, 
Regulation and Restriction of Access to Cannabis” (2017), https://www.cpha.ca/public-
health-approach-legalization-regulation-and-restriction-access-cannabis. 
279 Pacula, et al., supra note 107, at 1023–24. 
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Table 4: Cannabis Delivery in Proposed Bills 
Type State Bills 
Delivery 
Prohibited 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B.1438 §§ 15-65(n)(9)-(10) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 § 6(9);  
S.F. 619 § 6(9) 
Vermont 
H.B. 250 § 907(e);  
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(e)) 
Virginia 
H.B. 2371 § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(d); 
H.B. 2373 art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(d) 
Delivery 
Permitted 
Connecticut S.B. 487 § 18(5) 
Hawaii H.B. 1581 § 2(11)(a)(6) 
Illinois H.B. 902 § 935(3.5) 
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 2(3)(e) 
New 
Hampshire 
H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I)(g)) 
New Jersey 
S.B. 2703 § (27)(h); 
A.B. 4497 § (27)(h) 
New York 
S.B. 1509 § 130(7); 
A.B. 2009 § 130(7); 
A.B. 1617 § 11(165)(5); 
S.B. 1527 § 11(165)(5); 
A.B. 3506 § 11(165)(5); 
S.B. 3040 § 11(165)(5) 
Vermont H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 907(c)) 
West 
Virginia 
H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-8(1); 
H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-8(1) 
 
4. Outlet Density Restrictions 
 
Alcohol outlet density is positively associated with excessive 
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consumption and related harms.280 Because this finding applies to both on- 
and off-premises outlets (i.e., both bars and liquor stores), there are parallels 
to cannabis regulation whether or not a jurisdiction permits on-site 
consumption. Higher tobacco outlet density is also associated with increased 
youth smoking rates,281 and outlet density also affects adult smoking via 
interaction between price sensitivity and access costs, including travel 
time.282 While the economics of cannabis markets and their impact on youth 
and adult use are less well-established than those of alcohol and tobacco, 
broadly similar effects are likely and a reasonable basis for limiting cannabis 
retail outlet density to protect public health. 
 
A New Jersey bill would set a statewide maximum of 218 licenses, 
including 98 medical licenses, with each legislative district receiving at least 
2 licenses and the remaining 40 licenses considered at-large.283 Illinois’s 
enacted 2019 legislation prohibits location of a retail cannabis dispensary 
within 1,500 feet of the property line of any pre-existing dispensary.284 
 
In contrast, some states address density from the perspective of minimum 
rather than maximum outlets. Another New Jersey bill would require a 
“sufficient number of [retailers] to meet the market demands of the state, and 
giving regard to geographical and population distribution.”285 A separate 
New Jersey bill would require a minimum one retail store per county, 
amounting to 21 in the state, but would allow local governments to set 
maximums to account for population distribution and consumer access.286 A 
West Virginia bill would set a minimum of one retail cannabis store for every 
 
280 E.g., Carla A. Campbell, et al., The Effectiveness of Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density 
as a Means of Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-related Harms, 37 AM. 
J. PREVENTIVE MED. 556 (2009). See also Task Force on Community Preventive Servs., 
Recommendations for Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-related 
Harms by Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density, AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 570 (2009); Pacula, et 
al., supra note 107 (summarizing evidence and recommending limitations on outlet density 
to reduce harms). 
281 Lisa Henriksen, et al., Is Adolescent Smoking Related to the Density and Proximity 
of Tobacco Outlets and Retail Cigarette Advertising Near Schools?, 47 PREVENTIVE MED. 
210 (2008); Scott P. Novak, et al., Retail Tobacco Outlet Density and Youth Cigarette 
Smoking: A Propensity-modeling Approach, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 670 (2006); Laura J. 
Finan, et al., Tobacco Outlet Density and Adolescents’ Cigarette Smoking: A Meta-analysis, 
28 TOB CONTROL 27 (2019).  
282 See, e.g., John E. Schneider, et al., Tobacco Outlet Density and Demographics at the 
Tract Level of Analysis in Iowa: Implications for Environmentally Based Prevention 
Initiatives, 6 PREVENTIVE SCI. 319 (2005). 
283 S.B. 2702 § 9(a)(14) (N.J. 2018). 
284 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 15-65(n)(15) (Ill. 2019).  
285 A.B. 4497 § 16(a)(14) (N.J. 2018). 
286 A.B. 3819 § 8(a)(14) (N.J. 2018). 
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ten retail liquor stores, though regulators could reduce this if there are an 
insufficient number of qualified applicants.287  
 
5. Day and Time Operating Restrictions 
 
Evidence from alcohol control indicates that limits on the days and hours 
during which alcohol can be sold are an effective intervention to reduce 
excessive consumption and related harms. Studies that support the 
effectiveness of these approaches typically assess the effects of removing 
existing restrictions, demonstrating an association between such a change and 
increased consumption and motor vehicle-related harms.288 Studies on 
imposing new limits are lacking. However, a systematic review of studies on 
day and time operating restrictions (as well as outlet density) found that most 
studies support the existence of an effect on one or more key outcomes 
(overall alcohol consumption, drinking patterns, and damage from 
alcohol).289 A precautionary approach to cannabis based on existing alcohol 
control evidence is warranted given the similar intoxicating potential of 
cannabis use. 
 
State proposals in general do not address cannabis establishment 
operating hours, leaving them to implementing regulations or local rules. 
However, at least three bills address operating hours at the statutory level. 
Bills in New Hampshire and West Virginia would leave specific operating 
hour restrictions to implementing regulations, but stipulate that the 
regulations not allow retailers to operate before 6:00 a.m. or after 11:45 
p.m.290 Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation limits dispensary operating hours 
to between 6:00 a.m. and 10 p.m.291 
 
C.  Youth, Environmental Exposure, and Normalization 
 
1. Minimum Purchase Age  
 
All U.S. states have adopted a legal drinking age of 21, though many did 
 
287 H.B. 2376 §11-16A-15(c)(5)(A) (W. Va. 2019). 
288 Task Force on Community Preventive Servs., Recommendations on Maintaining 
Limits on Days and Hours of Sale of Alcoholic Beverages to Prevent Excessive Alcohol 
Consumption and Related Harms, 39 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 605 (2010). 
289 Svetlana Popova, et al., Hours and Days of Sale and Density of Alcohol Outlets: 
Impacts on Alcohol Consumption and Damage: A Systematic Review, 44 ALCOHOL & 
ALCOHOLISM 500 (2009). 
290 H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I)(n)) (N.H. 2019); H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-15(c)(10) (W. Va. 
2019). 
291 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-65(j) (Ill. 2019). 
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not do so until pressured by the federal government in the 1980s.292 A 
growing number of jurisdictions have also raised their minimum legal age for 
tobacco purchase to 21.293 All existing state adult use cannabis laws have 
established 21 as the minimum purchase and possession age.294 Notably, 
Canada has adopted a minimum age of 18,295 consistent with the country’s 
minimum alcohol purchase age.296 As with alcohol, provinces can adopt their 
own higher age minimums for cannabis.297  
 
Based on existing public health evidence, a minimum age of 21 is the 
most appropriate standard for cannabis. Like alcohol, cannabis has risks 
associated with intoxicated driving.298 Raising the minimum age for alcohol 
was associated with a reduction in motor vehicle accidents,299  and similar 
public health protection is appropriate for cannabis. Raising the minimum 
 
292 In 1984 Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 
(2012), which threatened to withhold a portion of federal highway funding for states that did 
not establish 21 as the minimum legal age for purchase and public possession of alcohol. The 
Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Act’s constitutionality in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203 (1987). 
293 As of March 2019, 7 states and at least 440 localities had adopted 21 as the minimum 
legal age for tobacco purchases. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, “States and Localities 
That Have Raised the Minimum Legal Sale Age for Tobacco Products to 21” (2019),  
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/sales_21/st
ates_localities_MLSA_21.pdf. 
294 ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.020; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a) (2017); 
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(e); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B. § 1501(1) 2017); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 2(b) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27955(1) (2018); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 453D.110 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.316(1)(a) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 4230a (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013(5) (2015). 
295 Cannabis Act, 2018 S.C., ch. 16 § 8 (Can.). 
296 Each province or territory sets its own minimum drinking age. The minimum 
drinking age is 18 in three provinces and 19 in the other 10. Canadian Centre on Substance 
Use and Addiction, “Policy and Regulation (Alcohol): Legal Drinking Age in Canada,” 
https://www.ccsa.ca/policy-and-regulations-alcohol, accessed May 28, 2019. 
297 As of July 2019, two provinces (Alberta and Quebec) have adopted 18 as the 
minimum age, and all others have adopted 19. Health Canada, “Cannabis in the provinces 
and territories,” https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-
medication/cannabis/laws-regulations/provinces-territories.html (last modified Feb. 4, 
2019). 
298 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 227–30; Rebecca L. 
Hartman & Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 
478 (2013); R. Andrew Sewell, et al., The Effect of Cannabis Compared with Alcohol on 
Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 185 (2009). 
299 Adoption of the national minimum age of 21 for alcohol in the U.S. was associated 
with a 16% median decrease in motor vehicle crashes, as well as decreased alcohol 
consumption among those aged 18 to 20 and those aged 21 to 25. U.S Ctrs. for Disease 
Control and Prevention, “Age 21 Minimum Legal Drinking Age” (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-drinking-age.htm. 
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age for alcohol was also associated with decreased alcohol consumption 
among those ages 18–20 and 21–25.300 Based on existing scientific evidence, 
the potential negative effects of cannabis use on brain development301 (which 
continues up to approximately age 25) strongly support efforts to reduce 
consumption by young adults. Assuming similar policy effects on cannabis 
consumption as for alcohol, a minimum age of at least 21 is prudent. 
 
In nearly all cases, proposed legislative adult use bills set 21 as the legal 
age for purchase and possession302 (as does Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation303). The sole exceptions are two bills in Hawaii that would set the 
age at 18.304 However, both of these bills are primarily aimed at 
decriminalization, rather than the establishment of a legal adult use cannabis 
market in the state.305 Additionally, a New Jersey bill would allow cannabis 
delivery staff to be as young as 18,306 though the bill would authorize sales 
only to those over 21.307 
 
2. Flavors and Other Additives 
 
Flavors have documented impacts on attracting young smokers to 
 
300 Id.  
301 Kirsten Weir, Marijuana and the Developing Brain, MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY,  
Nov. 2015, at 48, available at https://www.apa.org/monitor/2015/11/marijuana-brain. 
Considerable development in this area of research is likely as data become available from 
the ongoing Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) Study, a landmark 10-year 
longitudinal study of nearly 12,000 participants supported by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) that will include study of the effects of cannabis use, among myriad other 
factors. See generally Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, “Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Brain 
Cognitive Development (ABCD Study)” (2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-
topics/adolescent-brain/longitudinal-study-adolescent-brain-cognitive-development-abcd-
study. 
302E.g., S.B. 686 § 2 (Haw. 2019)(“personal use”); H.B. 902 § 5 (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80§§ 
2, 3 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX(1)(A) (Md. 2019); H.B. 420 § 2(subdiv. 2) (Minn. 
2019); S.B. 577 § 22 (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1509 § 65 (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 250 § 907(b) (Vt. 
2019); H.B. 3108 § 19-37-2 (W. Va. 2019). 
303 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-10, 10-5(a) (Ill. 2019). 
304 H.B. 1515 § 2, 30th Legislature, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779 § 2, 30th 
Legislature, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019). 
305 H.B. 1515 § 1, 30th Legislature, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779 § 1, 30th 
Legislature, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019). 
306 S.B. 2703 §§ 27(h)(4), 29(c), 218th Legislature, First Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
307 S.B. 2703 § 6, 218th Legislature, First Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
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traditional tobacco products308 and e-cigarettes.309 Flavors disguise the 
unpleasant taste of smoke, and some have even more far-reaching effects. 
Menthol, for example, contributes to nicotine dependence through behavioral 
reinforcement310 and increases nicotine exposure by encouraging breath 
holding.311 In 2009 FDA banned characterizing flavors in cigarettes.312 This 
prohibition controversially failed to include menthol cigarettes or flavored 
non-cigarette tobacco (e.g., cigars), but still succeeded in reducing the 
probability of being a smoker and number of cigarettes smoked among 
adolescents.313 Local jurisdictions are now leading efforts to prohibit other 
flavored tobacco products, including electronic tobacco products (e.g., 
JUUL®) that have rapidly increased in popularity among youth.314 
 
In alcohol policy, “control jurisdictions” (those that operate monopolies 
over some aspect of distribution) have banned or restricted a variety of 
products due to flavoring that appeals to youth, among other reasons.315 The 
FDA has also acted to prohibit alcohol manufacturers from adding caffeine 
to their products, deeming it an “unsafe food additive” in the context of 
 
308 Carrie M. Carpenter, et al., New Cigarette Brands with Flavors that Appeal to Youth: 
Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1601 (2005); U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2012), available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK99237/; Andrea C. Villanti, et al., Flavored 
Tobacco Product Use in Youth and Adults: Findings From the First Wave of the PATH Study 
(2013-2014), 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 139 (2017). 
309 Bridget K. Ambrose, et al., Flavored Tobacco Product Use Among US Youth Aged 
12-17 Years, 2013-2014, 314 JAMA 1871 (2015); Grace Kong, et al., Reasons for Electronic 
Cigarette Experimentation and Discontinuation Among Adolescents and Young Adults, 17 
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 847 (2015); Emily A. McDonald & Pamela M. Ling, One of 
Several ‘Toys’ for Smoking: Young Adult Experiences with Electronic Cigarettes in New 
York City, 24 TOB CONTROL 588 (2015).  
310 Karen Ahijevych & Bridgette E. Garrett, The Role of Menthol in Cigarettes as a 
Rreinforcer of Smoking Behavior, 12 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S110 (2010). 
311 Samuel Garten & R. Victor Falkner, Role of Mentholated Cigarettes in Increased 
Nicotine Dependence and Greater Risk of Tobacco-attributable Disease, 38 PREVENTIVE 
MED. 793 (2004). 
312 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 123 Stat. 1776 § 907 (2009). 
313 Charles J. Courtemanche, et al., Influence of the Flavored Cigarette Ban on 
Adolescent Tobacco Use, 52 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. e139 (2017). 
314 Madison Park & Ron Selig, San Francisco Bans Sales of Flavored Tobacco Products, 
CNN.COM, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/health/san-francisco-flavored-cigarettes-
proposition-e/index.html; Associated Press, Nation's First E-Cigarette Ban Proposed in San 
Francisco, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/san-francisco-e-cigarettes-
temporary-ban-proposed-vaping-juul/. 
315 Elyse R. Grossman, et al., The Use of Regulatory Power by U.S. State and Local 
Alcohol Control Agencies to Ban Problematic Products, 53 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1229 
(2018). 
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alcoholic malt beverages.316 
 
Two Vermont bills would prohibit including nicotine or alcoholic 
beverages in cannabis products offered for sale.317  A Virginia bill would 
prohibit additives in edible products that are toxic or harmful to humans or 
are specifically designed to make the product more addictive or to appeal to 
persons under 21.318 A New Hampshire bill would similarly require the newly 
created regulatory agency responsible for cannabis in the state to promulgate 
regulations that include “a prohibition on any vaporization device that 
includes toxic or addictive additives,”319 and would also explicitly prohibit 
nicotine as an additive.320 A Kentucky bill would also charge the regulatory 
agency with restricting additives “that are toxic or increase the likelihood of 
addiction.”321 None of the proposed bills explicitly prohibits flavoring agents, 
though implementing regulations could address this and other shortcomings.  
 
In most states, detailed determinations on questions such as which 
additives are considered toxic, addictive, or attractive to youth would be 
answered by applicable regulatory agencies consistent with the state’s 
administrative rulemaking procedures. For example, in California’s adult use 
framework, the state’s Department of Public Health oversees manufactured 
cannabis products and regulates what additives are permitted.322 Among other 
elements, the Department prohibits manufacturing cannabis products 
containing alcoholic beverages and those with additives that “increase 
potency, toxicity, or addictive potential,” including nicotine and caffeine.323 
 
316 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., “Caffeinated Alcoholic Beverages” (2010), 
https://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/foodadditivesingredients/ucm1903
66.htm. 
317 H.B. 250 § 881(a)(3)(F)(ii) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F)(ii)) (Vt. 
2019). 
318 H.B. 2371 § 3.2-4151(A)(5) (Va. 2018). The bill does not define who would make 
such determinations, but would presumably leave this to regulation under the Board of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services, which would have authority to adopt additional health 
and safety regulations. Id. § 3.2-4151(B); see generally id. § 3.2-4122 (powers and duties of 
the Board). 
319 H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I)(t)) (N.H. 2019). This section also authorizes restrictions on 
“types of vaporizers that are particularly likely to be utilized by minors without detection,” 
id., likely a response to the growing popularity of easily concealed nicotine vaporizers such 
as JUUL®. 
320 H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I)(p)(3)) (N.H. 2019). 
321 S.B. 80 § 4(3)(i) (Ky. 2019).  
322 See Cal. Dep’t of Pub. Health, DPH-17-010: Cannabis Manufacturing Licensing  
(2018) § 40300. 
323 Id. § 40300(a)–(b). However, following a public comment period, the Department of 
Public Health rejected recommendations, including from the authors of this paper, to include 
naturally-occurring caffeine (e.g., coffee), as well as menthol and other characterizing 
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Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly vests the Department of Public 
Health with authority to adopt and enforce rules for the manufacture and 
processing of infused products, but does not specifically address additives.324  
 
3. Advertising and Marketing 
 
Restrictions on tobacco advertising and marketing efforts are among the 
most universally recommended policy interventions in tobacco control, as 
reflected in WHO FCTC Article 13’s call for a “comprehensive ban on 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship” as consistent with applicable 
constitutional principles.325 A total ban is likely inconsistent with U.S. law, 
and indeed the caveat for national constitutional principles was in part shaped 
by opposition from the U.S.,326 which nevertheless remains one of only a 
small number of WHO member states that has not ratified the treaty.327 The 
U.S. Surgeon General concluded that tobacco advertising and promotional 
activities are causally related to youth smoking initiation and continuation,328 
and the WHO attributed one-third of youth tobacco experimentation to 
exposure to tobacco advertising.329 Alcohol advertising exposure is similarly 
associated with youth initiation and with overconsumption.330 
 
Restrictions on speech are disfavored under First Amendment 
jurisprudence; however, government regulation of commercial speech to 
protect consumer health and safety is a well-supported exercise of public 
health authority when applied within appropriate parameters. Commercial 
speech is speech proposing a commercial transaction, defined as a form of 
advertising that identifies a specific product for the purpose of economic 
 
flavors, among prohibited additives. Cal. Dep’t of Pub. Health, “DPH-17-010: Cannabis 
Manufacturing Licensing, Response to Comments Received During the 45-Day Comment 
Period,” 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CEH/DFDCS/MCSB/CDPH%20Document%20Librar
y/DPH17010_45DayResponses.pdf  (last accessed May 7, 2019); see also Daniel G. 
Orenstein, et al., “Comment on Proposed Regulation: DPH-17-010, July 3, 2018, available 
at https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/Comment%20on%20DPH-
17-010%2C%20Cannabis%20Manufacturing%20Licensing.pdf. 
324 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 55-5(e) (Ill. 2019). 
325 WHO FCTC, supra note 78, at 11.  
326 “Adoption of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,” AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 689–
90,  (2003). 
327 World Health Org., supra note 91.  
328 U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 308.  
329 World Health Org., WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic pt. 30 (2013), 
available at  http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85380/1/9789241505871_eng.pdf. 
330 David Jernigan, et al., Alcohol Marketing and Youth Alcohol Consumption: A 
Systematic Review of Longitudinal Studies Published Since 2008, 112 ADDICTION 7 (2017). 
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benefit. While commercial speech nominally receives less constitutional 
protection than other forms of speech (and received none until 1975), these 
protections are still significant.331 For commercial speech about a lawful 
product that is truthful and not misleading, government must show that it has 
a substantial interest, that the regulation of speech advances that interest, and 
that the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the 
government’s stated interest,332 a familiar test originating in Central 
Hudson.333  
 
Government has interests in regulating advertising that increases use of 
harmful products, markets age-restricted products to youth, or misleads the 
public.334 Government interest in controlling cannabis use to protect public 
health is almost certainly substantial. State interests in protecting health, 
safety, and welfare are almost always found to be substantial, including 
interests in prevention of youth smoking, traffic safety, and temperance,335 
all three of which are closely related to cannabis use, as well. As a result, the 
key issues for restrictions on cannabis advertising will be the extent to which 
the regulations directly advance this interest and whether the restrictions are 
more extensive than necessary.336 
 
A Connecticut bill would prohibit “any type of marketing and advertising 
of the sale of recreational marijuana,”337 although the constitutionality of 
such a broad provision may be questionable.338 Other Connecticut bills would 
 
331 GOSTIN, supra note 204, at 345–47. 
332 Id. at 347–50. 
333 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The 
split between federal and state law on the legality of cannabis complicates application of 
commercial speech protections to cannabis. Depending on state constitutional law, cannabis 
advertising may receive lesser commercial speech protections because the drug is illegal 
under federal law and thus its advertising arguably fails to satisfy a required element for 
protection under Central Hudson. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising 
and Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 1081 (2017); see also ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 235, at 23–27. 
For purposes of this article, we presume that cannabis advertising has some level of 
commercial speech protection. 
334 GOSTIN, supra note 204, at 344–45. 
335 Id. at 350–52. 
336 See id. at 352–55 (detailing commercial speech analysis in public health regulation). 
337 H.B. 5595 (Conn. 2019). 
338 See, e.g., ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 235, at 23–25. If appropriately limited 
to regulation of sales conduct that is non-expressive, restrictions on commercial speech may 
survive judicial scrutiny, though direct regulation of the conduct (e.g., price discounting 
techniques) may accomplish the same objective with less risk of overstepping constitutional 
boundaries. Jacobs, supra note 333, at 1104–06, 1132–33. Nevertheless, if adequately 
justified and targeted to directly advance a substantial government interest, even restrictions 
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bar “mass-market campaigns that have a high likelihood of reaching 
children,”339 a stricter standard than those setting audience composition 
ceilings (e.g., prohibiting advertising in publications or media where the 
percentage of viewers under the legal age for purchase is reasonably expected 
to be above a certain threshold340). A New Hampshire bill would similarly 
prohibit “mass-market campaigns that have a high likelihood of reaching 
minors,” as well as promotional products and product giveaways.341 
 
A New Jersey bill would restrict advertising “in ways that target or are 
designed to appeal to [persons under 21],” including depictions of persons 
under 21 or the presence of objects suggesting the presence of a person under 
21, such as toys or cartoon characters, and also restricts “any other depiction 
designed in any manner to be especially appealing to a person under 21.”342 
 
Multiple New Jersey bills would also impose restrictions on cannabis 
advertising, including: 
 
• Limiting retailers to a single sign of up to 1,600 square inches 
(approximately 11 square feet) visible to the general public; 
• Prohibiting advertising “on television, radio or the Internet 
between the hours of 6:00am and 10:00pm;”343 
• Requiring “reliable evidence that no more than 20 percent of the 
audience . . . is reasonably expected to be under [21]”; 
• Prohibiting marketing using location-based devices (e.g., cell 
phones) except under limited circumstances; 
• Prohibiting sponsorship of charitable, sports, musical, artistic, 
cultural, social, or other similar events absent “reliable evidence” 
that no more than 20% of the audience is expected to be under 21; 
and 
• Prohibiting advertising within 200 feet of schools, recreation 
centers, parks, child care centers, playgrounds, public pools, 
libraries, or on public transit vehicles, transit shelters, or on or in 
 
on protected commercial speech can withstand constitutional challenge. Id. at 1117–21. 
339 H.B. 5458 § 13(10) (Conn. 2018); S.B. 487 § 19(a)(9) (Conn. 2018); H.B. 1581 § 2 
(adding § 11(a)(12))(Haw. 2019). 
340 See, e.g., A.B. 4497 § 16(9)(c) (N.J. 2018) (allowing cannabis advertising only if the 
licensee “has reliable evidence that at least 71.6 percent of the audience for the advertisement 
is reasonably expected to be 21 years of age or older”); H.B. 250 § 7 (tit. 7, § 864)(b) (Vt. 
2019) (limiting cannabis advertising “unless the licensee can show that no more than 30 
percent of the audience is reasonably expected to be under 21 years of age”).    
341 H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I(l)) (N.H. 2019). 
342 A.B. 3581 §  9(a)(7)(a)(iv) (N.J. 2018) (emphasis added). 
343 It is unclear how such time restrictions could be imposed on web-based advertising. 
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public owned and operated property.344 
 
A New Mexico bill would explicitly prohibit cannabis product 
advertising via billboard, radio, television, or other broadcast media.345 
Anticipating possible constitutional challenge, the bill also provides that this 
prohibition would cease to be in effect in the event of federal cannabis 
legalization.346 The bill would also prohibit advertising that: 
 
• is false, deceptive or misleading, including unproven health 
benefit claims; 
• depicts consumption by persons under 21; 
• is designed using cartoon characters; 
• mimics other product brands; 
• is within 300 feet of a school, church, or daycare center; 
• is in public transit vehicles or stations or on publicly owned or 
operated property; or 
• is an unsolicited internet pop-up.347 
 
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly prohibits advertising that: 
• is false or misleading; 
• promotes overconsumption; 
• depicts actual consumption; 
• depicts consumption by a person under 21; 
• “makes any health, medicinal, or therapeutic claims”; 
• includes “cannabis leaf or bud” imagery; 
• includes images “designed or likely to appeal to minors, including 
cartoons, toys, animals, or children, or any other likeness to 
images, characters or phrases that is designed in any manner to be 
appealing to or encourage consumption” by persons under 21; 
• is within 1,000 feet of schools grounds or a playground, recreation 
center, child care center, public park, public library, or game 
arcade not restricted to adults; 
• is on or in public transit vehicles or shelters; 
 
344 A.B. 3581 § 9(a)(9) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819 8(a)(9) (N.J. 2018). 
345 H.B. 356 § 21(A)(1)(a) (N.M. 2019). 
346 H.B. 356 § 21(B) (N.M. 2019). See also Jacobs, supra note 333, at 1097–98 (noting 
that commercial speech protections in some state constitutions are similar to those of the 
U.S. Constitution); but see ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 235, at 15–16 (noting that 
commercial speech analysis under state law may differ from federal law and that federal 
protections may not apply due to cannabis’ federal illegality). 
347 H.B. 356 § 21(A)(1) (N.M. 2019). 
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• is on or in publicly owned or operated property.348 
 
The Illinois legislation also prohibits promotions incorporating cannabis 
giveaways or any games or competitions related to cannabis consumption.349 
 
4. Public Use and On-Site Consumption 
 
Decades of research have firmly established the link between tobacco 
smoke and various serious health harms to nearly every organ of the human 
body, as well as cancer, inflammation, fetal harm, and impaired immune 
function.350 Secondhand exposure similarly causes a variety of harms with no 
risk-free level of exposure.351 The similarity of tobacco smoke and cannabis 
smoke352 is therefore cause for concern. Moreover, there is already 
substantial evidence for a relationship between cannabis use and negative 
respiratory effects,353 as well as evidence for associations with cardiovascular 
disease, respiratory disease, neurological disease, and cancer.354 
 
The establishment of comprehensive smokefree laws in states and 
localities over the past several decades is an important public health 
achievement that protects the health of employees in enclosed workplaces as 
well as countless members of the community in public places. Similar 
restriction on the public use of cannabis and cannabis products is appropriate 
to avoid undermining public health progress by allowing smoking (of any 
type) in public locations or re-normalizing smoking behavior generally.355 
 
348 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. §§ 55-20(a)–(b) (Ill. 2019). 
349 Id. § 55-20(d). 
350 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3–8 
(2006), available at 
ttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44324/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK44324.pdf. 
351 Id.  
352 Moir, et al., supra note 84. 
353 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 16, 181–96. 
354 Id. at 15–16, 19; Xiaoyin Wang, et al., One Minute of Marijuana Secondhand Smoke 
Exposure Substantially Impairs Vascular Endothelial Function, 5 J. AM. HEART ASS’N 
e003858 (2016); Pal Pacher, et al., Cardiovascular Effects of Marijuana and Synthetic 
Cannabinoids:The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 15 NATURE REVS. CARDIOLOGY 151  
(2018); Kelly P. Owen, et al., Marijuana: Respiratory Tract Effects, 46 CLINICAL REV. 
ALLERGY IMMUNOLOGY 65 (2014); Madeline H. Meier, et al., Persistent cannabis users 
show neuropsychological decline from childhood to midlife, 109 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S.A. E2657 (2012); RAJPAL S. TOMAR, ET AL., CAL. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, 
EVIDENCE ON THE CARCINOGENICITY OF MARIJUANA SMOKE (2009), available at 
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crnr/finalmjsmokehid.pdf.   
355 See Stanton A. Glantz, et al., Marijuana, Secondhand Smoke, and Social 
Acceptability, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 13 (2018) (discussing social norm change with 
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Social equity considerations that attach to public smoking bans when 
applied to cannabis must be addressed,356 but it is typically much easier to 
liberalize a restrictive policy than to ratchet up restrictions on behavior. The 
long public health battle to reduce secondhand smoke exposure in bars, 
restaurants, and other public locations is a key example of the latter.357 At 
minimum, an effective public health strategy to cannabis regulation should 
include addition of cannabis smoke and vapor to existing smokefree laws 
covering tobacco products to prevent erosion of progress reducing 
environmental tobacco exposure.358 
 
All 10 states that legalized adult use prior to 2019 have prohibited public 
use.359 They have also frequently added cannabis to existing smokefree 
laws.360 However, some states have explicitly authorized on-site 
consumption exemptions to indoor smoking restrictions361 or allowed 
localities to do so.362 Such exemptions threaten to undermine other smokefree 
laws if the tobacco industry attempts to leverage them to create additional 
smoking spaces in an effort to renormalize smoking behavior. Jurisdictions 
adopting this approach should explicitly prohibit tobacco use in such 
locations by law and consider other limitations to reduce secondhand 
cannabis smoke exposure for employees, such as restricting consumption 
areas to outdoor locations or requiring strict physical separation from 
 
respect to tobacco and cannabis use). 
356 See, e.g., ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 235, at 35–36. 
357 See STANTON A. GLANTZ & EDITH D. BALBACH, TOBACCO WAR: INSIDE THE 
CALIFORNIA BATTLES  1–18 (University of California Press. 2000); see generally, e.g., 
Andrew Hyland, et al., Smoke-free Air Policies: Past, Present and Ffuture, 21 TOBACCO 
CONTROL 139 (2012). 
358 See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS, MODEL ORDINANCE PROHIBITING 
SMOKING IN ALL WORKPLACES AND PUBLIC PLACES (100% SMOKEFREE) 3–4, 7 (2018);  
ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 235, at 35–36. 
359 ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.38.020(4), 17.38.040; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11362.3(a)(1) (2017); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(d); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B,  
§ 1501(2)(A)(2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 13(c) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
333.27954(e) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453D.400 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.381 
(2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4230a(a)(2)(A) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.445 
(2015). 
360 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.3(a)(2) (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 28-B, § 1501(2)(B)(2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 13(c) (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18, §  4230a(a)(2)(A) (2018).  
361 E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 306.200(a) (2019); see also Memorandum from 
April Simpson, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, to Debbie Morgan, Department of 
Commerce, Community and Economic Development (Mar. 12, 2019), available at 
https://aws.state.ak.us/OnlinePublicNotices/Notices/Attachment.aspx?id=116574. 
362 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2600(g) (2018). 
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employee work areas. However, only completely smokefree environments 
fully protect nonsmokers.363  
 
As in existing adult use states, proposed bills (and Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation) uniformly prohibit public consumption of cannabis, though there 
are some distinguishing features, as presented in Table 4, below.  
 
A Hawaii bill would apply any restrictions on tobacco products and 
smoking to non-medical cannabis.364 Multiple New York bills would 
similarly prohibit cannabis smoking in public and any location where 
smoking tobacco is prohibited by law.365 A New Mexico bill would prohibit 
smoking cannabis in public places, but would not include electronic devices 
creating a vapor in the definition of “smoking.”366 Two New Jersey bills 
would prohibit smoking cannabis in any location where tobacco smoking is 
prohibited, as well as any indoor public place even if tobacco smoking is 
permitted. They would also prohibit cannabis smoking within the campuses 
and facilities of public and private higher education institutions.367 
 
A Minnesota bill would add not only smoked cannabis, but all lighted and 
vapor cannabis products to the state’s clean indoor air act.368 Taking 
advantage of an opportunity to revise this law, the bill would also add 
electronic nicotine devices (ENDS) to existing indoor smoking prohibitions 
(e.g., at public schools).369 
 
A Connecticut bill would prohibit all cannabis consumption (including 
smoking, vaping, and other forms) in all places where tobacco smoking is 
prohibited and in any public place.370 
 
363 See, e.g., U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, “Ventilation Does Not 
Effectively Protect Nonsmokers from Secondhand Smoke” (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/protection/ven
tilation/index.htm (listing conclusions from reports by the U.S. Surgeon General, WHO, and 
ASHRAE). We have recommended in other work that legalizing jurisdictions initially 
prohibit on-site consumption areas, on the basis that it is easier to liberalize policy later when 
evidence on the impacts of cannabis smoke is better established than to regulate such spaces 
out of existence once in operation, as well as concern that existing tobacco restrictions could 
suffer. See  ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, supra note 235, at 32–36. 
364 S.B. 686 § 2 (329-B(f)) (Haw. 2019). 
365 A.B. 3506 § 25 (N.Y. 2017); A.B. 3506 § 25 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527 § 25 (N.Y. 
2019); S.B. 3040 § 25 (N.Y. 2017). 
366H.B. 356 § 31(C) (N.M. 2019). 
367 A.B. 4497 §§ 4(c), 73 (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2703 §§ 4(c), 73 (N.J. 2018). 
368 H.F. 420, art. 3 § 1 (Minn. 2019). 
369 H.F. 420, art. 3 § 1 (Minn. 2019). 
370 S.B. 487 § 21 (Conn. 2018). 
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Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation prohibits “smoking” cannabis where 
smoking is prohibited by the state’s clean indoor air law without explicitly 
including vapor products,371 but also more generally prohibits “using” 
cannabis in any public place,372 which is broadly defined and applies to most 
non-residential locations.373 The legislation also specifically prohibits using 
cannabis “knowingly in close physical proximity to anyone under 21 years of 
age who is not a registered medical cannabis patient” in the state.374 
 
Several state bills would make exceptions to smokefree laws for on-site 
consumption areas, but restrictions on such locations vary. Some bills would 
allow on-site cannabis sales,375 others would either allow or require 
consumers to bring their own cannabis.376 Some would require consumption 
areas to be part of a licensed retailer or medical dispensary,377 others would 
allow or require independent licensure,378 and some would allow on-site 
consumption only in conjunction with a producer license379 (similar to a 
tasting room at an alcohol production facility). Some would allow consumers 
to leave with unused cannabis or cannabis products,380 but may require the 
product to be repackaged.381 Frequently, bills authorizing on-site 
consumption would not permit alcohol, tobacco, or nicotine sales or 
consumption at the same location.382  The effects of various restrictions are 
 
371 H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. §10-35(a)(4)) (Ill. 2019). 
372 Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(F). 
373 Id. § 10-35(a). 
374 Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(G). 
375 E.g., S.B. 1527 § 31 (170(5)) (N.Y. 2019) (allowing only retail licensees to be 
licensed for on-site consumption); A.B. 4497 § 72(a)(2) (N.J. 2018) (specifying that 
consumption areas must be separate from but on the same premises as a cannabis retailer or 
dispensary). 
376 E.g., A.B. 4497 § 3 (N.J. 2018) (“cannabis consumption area” may allow 
consumption of cannabis items “either obtained from the retailer or center, or brought by a 
person to the consumption area”); H.F. 465 § 16(subdiv. 1(b)(3)–(4)) (Minn. 2019) (sale or 
exchange of cannabis on premises prohibited). 
377 E.g., H.B. 356 § 6(H) (N.M. 2019), S.B. 1527 § 31 (170(5)) (N.Y. 2019). 
378 For example, a Connecticut bill would allow “marijuana lounges,” which would be 
“licensed to sell marijuana or marijuana products to consumers solely for on-site 
consumption.” H.B. 5458 § 1(11) (Conn. 2018) (emphasis added). This would be similar to 
many alcohol licenses for bars and restaurants. 
379 S.B. 577 § 4(B) (N.M. 2019). This is in part because the bill creates a state monopoly 
on retailer licensure.  
380 E.g., S.B. 2703 § 72(k)(1) (N.J. 2018). 
381 E.g., S.B. 2702 § 42(l)(1) (N.J. 2018). 
382 E.g., A.B. 4497 § 72(i)(2) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2703 § 72(i)(2) (N.J. 2018); H.F. 465 § 
16(c)(2) (Minn. 2019) (alcohol); H.B. 2371 § 3.2-4142(B)(4) (Va. 2018) (allowing cannabis 
retailers to sell any other product otherwise permitted by law other than tobacco or alcohol). 
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undetermined, but they are likely to impact the number and location of on-
site consumption areas. For example, if on-site sales are prohibited, this 
would limit profit-making potential and likely result in fewer licensed 
venues. The number and location of on-site consumption areas, in turn, will 
likely influence the extent to which they contribute to cannabis use 
normalization or erosion of smokefree restrictions in an area. 
 
Table 5: Public Use Provisions in Proposed Bills 
Type State Bills 
Prohibits All 
Public 
Cannabis 
Consumption 
Arizona S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (4-404) 
Connecticut H.B. 5595 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 10-35(a)(3)(F) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 §§ 2 (subdiv. 7), 8 (subdiv. 
2(a)(6)(ii)); 
S.F. 619 §§ 2 (subdiv. 7), 8 (subdiv. 
2(a)(6)(ii)) 
Missouri H.B. 551 § A (195.2153(2)) 
New Jersey 
A.B. 3819 § 3(c); 
S.B. 2702 § 4(c) 
New Mexico S.B. 577 § 23(B) 
West Virginia H.B. 2331 § 16A-17-3(2) 
Prohibits 
Public 
Cannabis 
“Smoking”  
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 4 
New Hampshire H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:4) 
New Mexico H.B. 356 § 31(A) 
New York 
A.B. 1617 § 25;  
A.B. 3506 § 25; 
S.B. 1527 § 25; 
S.B. 3040 § 25 
Rhode Island S.B. 2895 § 1 (21-28.10-8) 
West Virginia 
H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-5(a); 
H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-5(a) 
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Exempts 
Licensed 
Consumption 
Areas 
Connecticut H.B. 5458 §§ 1(11), 5 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 55-25(3) (as authorized and 
regulated by localities) 
Maryland 
H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX (1)(B)(3) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 465 § 16(subdiv. 1) 
New Jersey A.B. 4497 §§ 3, 4(c);  
S.B. 2703 §§ 3, 4(c) 
New Mexico H.B. 356 § 31(A);  
S.B. 577 § 4(B) 
New York S.B. 1509 art. 4, § 74;  
S.B. 1527 § 31 (art. 11, § 178); 
S.B. 3040 § 31 (art. 11, § 178);  
Virginia H.B. 2371 art. 7 § 3.2-4160 (A)(3);  
H.B. 2373 art. 3 § 3.2-4151 
Applies 
Existing 
Tobacco 
Consumption 
Restrictions 
Hawaii S.B. 686 § 329-B(f) 
Connecticut S.B. 487 § 21 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 10-35(a)(4) 
New Jersey 
S.B. 2703 § 4(c); 
A.B. 4497 § 4(c) 
New York 
A.B. 1617 § 25;  
A.B. 3506 § 25;  
S.B. 1527 § 25;  
S.B. 3040 § 25 
Vermont 
H.B. 196 § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833); 
H.B. 250 § 2 (tit. 7, § 831(5); 833); 
S.B. 54 § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833); 
Applies 
Existing 
Alcohol 
Consumption 
Restrictions 
New Jersey 
A.B. 3581 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c);  
S.B. 2702 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c); 
A.B. 4497 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c) 
 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
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A.  Legalization is Dynamic, and States are Poised to Act 
 
Cannabis policy is evolving quickly. Medical legalization spread from a 
single state in 1996 to 33 states and D.C. in 2018.383 Recreational legalization 
was non-existent until 2012 and in 2018 included 10 states and D.C. Given 
the recent electoral success of legalization campaigns, legalization in 
additional states is highly likely, though the precise form legalization may 
take remains up for debate.384 
 
Despite the dramatic pace of change in this policy area over the last 
several years, there remains the potential for considerable additional change 
at the state level. As of July 2019, there were 23 states that allow citizens to 
place an issue on the ballot via initiative (not including legislative 
referenda).385 Of these, 14 did not have adult use cannabis laws, 5 did not 
have comprehensive medical legalization laws, and 3 lacked even limited 
medical legalization for CBD/low-THC products (Table 5).386 The absence 
of legalization laws in many of these states in combination with recent legal 
changes in other states and overall public opinion trends creates a policy 
vacuum on the issue. In the absence of legislative action, ballot initiatives are 
likely to fill this space. 
 
Table 6: Cannabis Legalization in States with Initiative Process387 
State 
Limited 
Medical 
Medical Recreational 
Alaska -- Yes (1998) Yes (2014) 
Arizona -- Yes (2010) No388 
Arkansas -- Yes (2016) No 
 
383 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Marijuana Deep Dive,” supra note 10. 
384 Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20 at ___. 
385 INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., SIGNATURE, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTON AND 
SINGLE SUBJECT (SS) REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIATIVE PETITIONS (2018). This total does not 
include an unusual and restrictive process in Illinois. Id.; see also Initiative & Referendum 
Institute, “Illinois,” http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=9, last visited April 10, 
2019. 
386 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Marijuana Deep Dive,” supra note 10.; Nat’l 
Conference of State Legislatures, “State Medical Marijuana Laws,” supra note 60. 
387 See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “State Medical Marijuana Laws,” supra 
note 60 (listing medical and adult use laws in all U.S. states and territories). 
388 An adult use legalization initiative appeared on Arizona’s 2016 ballot but was 
narrowly defeated, 51.3%-48.7%. Ballotpedia.org, “Arizona Marijuana Legalization, 
Proposition 205 (2016)” (2019), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Marijuana_Legalization,_Proposition_205_(2016). 
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California -- Yes (1996) Yes (2016) 
Colorado -- Yes (2000) Yes (2012) 
Florida Yes (2014) Yes (2016) No 
Idaho No389 No No 
Maine -- Yes (1999) Yes (2016) 
Massachusetts -- Yes (2012) Yes (2016) 
Michigan -- Yes (2008) Yes (2018) 
Mississippi Yes (2014) No No 
Missouri Yes (2014) Yes (2018) No 
Montana -- Yes (2004) No 
Nebraska No No No 
Nevada -- Yes (2000) Yes (2016) 
North Dakota -- Yes (2016) No390 
Ohio -- Yes (2016) No 
Oklahoma -- Yes (2018) No 
Oregon -- Yes (1998) Yes (2014) 
South Dakota No No No 
Utah Yes (2014) Yes (2018) No 
Washington -- Yes (1998) Yes (2012) 
Wyoming Yes (2015) No No 
States Without: 3 / 23 5 / 23 13 / 23 
 
Based on electoral results between 2012 and 2018 and various public 
opinion polls,391 voters are highly supportive of medical legalization and 
 
389 The governor vetoed a legislative bill to allow limited medical access in 2015. Nat’l 
Conference of State Legislatures, “State Medical Marijuana Laws,” supra note 60.  
390 An adult use legalization initiative appeared on North Dakota’s November 2018 
ballot, but was unsuccessful. Ballotpedia.org, “North Dakota Measure 3, Marijuana 
Legalization and Automatic Expungement Initiative (2018)” (2019), 
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Measure_3,_Marijuana_Legalization_and_Automati
c_Expungement_Initiative_(2018). 
391 See generally Press Release, Quinnipiac University Poll (April 6, 2015), available at 
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/sw/ps04062015_Spg72ho.pdf/; ProCon.org, “Medical 
Marijuana: Votes and Polls, 2000-Present” (2017), 
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000149; 
Nat'l  Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), “State Polls” (2019), 
https://norml.org/library/state-polls-legalization. 
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moderately supportive of recreational legalization as general principles.392 
Depending on how much faith one has in the electorate to be discerning in 
evaluating ballot questions, it may be fair to ask whether, at this current high 
water mark for legalization support, voters will approve any legalization 
initiative that appears at face value to accomplish these goals. For now, at 
least, it appears that they will not. For example, Ohio’s 2015 Initiative 3 
would have legalized both medical and recreational cannabis. 393  According 
to an April 2015 state poll, 84% of Ohio voters supported medical 
legalization and 52% supported adult use legalization.394 Yet the initiative 
failed by a wide margin, capturing only 36% of the vote, the lowest of any 
legalization ballot measure of any type in any state since at least 2004.395 The 
Ohio measure was unusually constructed, giving oligopolistic control of the 
proposed cannabis market to a small cadre of interconnected corporate 
investors who provided nearly all of the initiative’s funding support, which 
appears to have contributed heavily to its defeat.396  
 
B.  Advantages of Legislative Legalization 
 
There are potential public health advantages to legislative legalization, 
whether medical or recreational.397 First, legislatively-enacted laws are 
considerably easier to change than voter-enacted laws. With relatively few 
limits, legislatures are free to later change statutes they have enacted.398 This 
 
392 See Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20 at ___ (detailing election results for cannabis 
legalization ballot initiatives). 
393 Ballotpedia.org, “Ohio Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Issue 3 (2015)” (2019),  
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Issue_3_(2015). 
394 Quinnipiac University Poll, supra note 391. 
395 Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20 at ___.  
396 David A. Graham, Why Did Ohio's Marijuana-Legalization Push Fail?, ATLANTIC, 
Nov. 3, 2015; see also Orenstein & Glantz, supra note 20 at ___.  
397 A legislative approach may also be advantageous for advocates, as Caulkins et al. 
explained following the defeat of California’s 2010 recreational initiative (Proposition 19) 
and before Colorado and Washington began the modern wave of recreational legalization: 
“Focusing on propositions may be short-sighted: To date, propositions have come closer to 
achieving marijuana legalization than has legislation. However, inasmuch as marijuana 
legalization has never been tried in the modern era and there are many complicated choices 
and details, it seems improbable that the initial design will get it right; likely it will take some 
trial and error and incremental adjustment to get the scheme worked out . . . . However, 
propositions are harder to adjust than are regimes established by legislation . . . . If pursuing 
a proposition, leave the specifics up to the policy makers: Some people who voted ‘no’ on 
Proposition 19 opposed its specifics, not legalization in the abstract. To win these swing 
voters, proponents should consider propositions that defer the details to state legislatures or 
other state-level policy makers.” Caulkins, et al. (2012), supra note 107, at 19–20 (internal 
reference omitted and emphasis added). 
398 The principle of legislative entrenchment generally bars a legislature from binding a 
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allows a legislature to adjust course to correct for, among other issues, 
drafting errors or ambiguities, incorrect assumptions (e.g., tax forecast399), 
changing market dynamics, improved scientific understanding of the health 
effects of cannabis consumption, and the observed impacts of different policy 
models in other jurisdictions. 
 
In contrast, several states’ laws afford voter-enacted laws substantial 
protection from legislative changes. For example, unless specifically 
authorized in the initiative language, California law prohibits the legislature 
from amending initiatives without returning to the people for a vote.400 
Arizona law prohibits the state legislature from amending laws passed by 
initiative or referendum with less than a three-fourths supermajority, and 
even with such a majority, the legislature may only make amendments that 
further the purpose of the law. To fundamentally alter or repeal the law, the 
legislature must submit the change to the voters via referendum.401 Several 
other states require legislative supermajorities to amend citizen initiatives or 
require a specified period of time to pass before the legislature can amend.402  
 
State efforts to regulate around voter-enacted marijuana initiatives may 
also face substantial legal challenge. For example, a Colorado regulation that 
would have required marijuana-focused publications to be kept behind store 
counters in order to reduce access by minors was struck down by a federal 
court after even the responsible regulatory agency and state attorney general’s 
office conceded its unconstitutionality.403 However, the construction of some 
state initiatives, such as those in Washington and Colorado, has allowed 
legislatures to more easily make changes.404 
 
future legislature, for example by requiring a larger legislative majority to change a statute. 
Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 
YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (arguing that prevailing doctrine against legislative entrenchment 
should be discarded and that legislatures should be able to bind future legislatures within the 
boundaries of other constitutional limitations) with John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 1773 (2003) (arguing that the prohibition on legislative entrenchment is correct as a 
matter of law and of good policy). 
399 See, e.g.,  Carnevale, et al., supra note 71, at 79 (discussing both Colorado’s massive 
overestimation of projected first year cannabis tax revenue and Washington’s comparable 
underestimation). 
400 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). 
401 ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. 1 § 1(6)(B)–(C). 
402 See generally Ballotpedia.org, “Legislative Alteration,” 
https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_alteration, last visited June 10, 2019. 
403 Trans-High Corp. v. Colorado, 58 F.Supp.3d 1177, (D. Colorado 2013) (mem.). 
404 Kleiman, supra note 259.The Colorado legislature used this authority to, among other 
things, address poorly labeled or easily overconsumed edibles. Id. In contrast, Arizona’s 
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The difficulties legislatures face in altering voter initiatives exist by 
design because initiatives are a vehicle for bypassing or overruling an 
unresponsive or resistant legislature.405 However, the inflexibility of 
initiatives can have broad and sometimes unintended consequences, 
especially when the initiative is exceedingly specific.406 Rigid legal 
frameworks imposed by initiative can restrict options for correcting errors, 
mitigating undesirable results, and reacting to changing circumstances,407 
precisely the type of nuanced, careful, and responsive policymaking tools 
frequently cited as necessary for cannabis policy in light of limited and fast-
changing scientific evidence.408 
 
Second, legislative legalization allows public health experts and 
advocates to play a more direct role in policy development (if they chose to 
participate). Voter initiatives are entirely the creations of the advocates who 
draft them. While they may adopt a variety of perspectives, they have neither 
the obligations to the public nor the resources of state legislatures. 
Legislatures have the authority, ability, and responsibility to involve a variety 
of perspectives in their decision-making. Among other powers, legislatures 
can actively involve public health experts through, among other avenues, 
expert testimony and grant-making to generate analysis. 
 
Third, legislative legalization better leverages the benefits of the 
“laboratories of democracy.” A small number of advocacy groups are 
responsible for most state legalization initiatives to date. As a result, states’ 
 
2016 proposal (which ultimately failed by a narrow margin) would have altered the state 
constitution and been exceedingly difficult to change, while the flexibility of California’s 
legalization initiative was between these two types. Id. However, lingering outgrowth of 
California’s earlier adoption of medical legalization may limit legislative options in some 
respects. For example, the state’s medical legalization initiative did not specify a limit on the 
amount of cannabis a qualified patient could possess or purchase. The legislature 
subsequently imposed such a limit, but the state supreme court invalidated this restriction. 
People v. Kelly, 47 Cal. 4th 1008 (Ca. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
405 John Dinan, State Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the Twenty-
first Century, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 61, 84–85 (2016) (citing ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE 
POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT 
LEGISLATION 291–92, 298   (Princeton University Press. 1999); see also Daniel G. Orenstein, 
Voter Madness? Voter Intent and the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
391(2015) (arguing that the language of Arizona’s medical cannabis law should be 
interpreted broadly in part because the initiative enacting the law was a direct response to 
prior state legislative resistance). 
406 Dinan, supra note 405, at 84–88. These concerns are particularly acute when the 
initiative alters a state constitution. Id. 
407 Id. at 84–85. 
408 Kleiman, supra note 259; CAULKINS, ET AL. (2015), supra note 107. 
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approaches have been highly similar. Whether via an enduring state-oriented 
approach409 or eventual federal legalization, greater variety in state policy 
will help demonstrate the effects of various policy decisions and aid future 
decision-making. The findings discussed in Part II illustrate that not only are 
public health principles gaining some traction in legislative legalization 
proposals that has been largely absent in ballot initiatives, but also that state 
legislatures will address problems in different ways, ultimately providing 
critical evidence to aid development of future best practice recommendations. 
 
C.  The Window for State Legislative Action is Open, But Limited 
 
Public health advocates have the opportunity to appropriate the 
momentum of the legalization movement and the underlying shift in public 
opinion to effect the positive impacts of legalization (e.g., market regulation) 
while potentially avoiding or at least blunting the negative effects of 
unfettered cannabis commercialization. Rather than presenting voters or 
legislators the binary choice between prohibition and laissez-faire 
legalization, public health-oriented legalization provides a more nuanced and 
beneficial middle path grounded in historical lessons and hard-learned best 
practices. 
 
Some of the public health approaches outlined may seem unachievable in 
the current policy environment. However, public health policies often 
progress slowly but ultimately yield largescale changes. Tobacco control is a 
leading example. In 1965, almost 42% of U.S. adults smoked cigarettes; it is 
now less than 16%.410 In the 1970s only the boldest advocates for 
nonsmokers’ rights sought even to require non-smoking sections in 
restaurants and other public places, and their early efforts received limited 
support from health organizations.411 Tobacco companies used cartoon 
characters in their marketing until the practice was proscribed by the 1998 
 
409 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 74–102 (2015) (arguing in favor of a system of 
“cooperative federalism” in which the federal government permits states with policies 
meeting specific benchmarks to opt out of CSA provisions relating to cannabis and exert 
exclusive control in this area under state law). 
410 U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, “Table 47. Current cigarette smoking 
among adults aged 18 and over, by sex, race, and age: United States, selected years 1965–
2016”  (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2017/047.pdf. Prevalence for specific 
populations was even higher. In 1965 over 50% of adult men and nearly 60% of adult 
African-American men smoked cigarettes. In 2016 those rates had dropped to 17.7% and 
20.3%, respectively. Id. 
411 See generally GLANTZ & BALBACH, supra note 357,  at 1–18 (discussing early 
tobacco control efforts relating to California’s failed Proposition 5 in 1978). 
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Master Settlement Agreement.412 U.S. law did not prohibit smoking on 
airplanes until 1990 (and until 2000 this prohibition included only domestic 
flights),413 after over 20 years of advocacy to overcome opposition from the 
tobacco industry and its allies.414 The history of tobacco control illustrates 
that the political and legal status quo does not dictate the potential for future 
public health policy success (and also that the road to such success is long 
and perilous, especially against powerful and entrenched industries). 
 
Ballot initiatives are born of frustration with perceived legislative 
inaction, obstinacy, or misalignment of interests. In the case of cannabis, the 
myriad failures and extensive collateral damage of the War on Drugs makes 
such frustration understandable. Still, the speedy adoption of legalization via 
initiative has outpaced scientific understanding of cannabis and its effects on 
health, leading to a difficult policy crossroads with no ideal resolution. The 
best available path forward is the one that most readily allows for course 
correction and minimizes unintended negative effects. A public health 
approach to cannabis legalization, adopted legislatively, is such a path for 
states unless and until a change in federal law, but the window for doing so 
will not remain open indefinitely. 
 
Policymakers’ reticence to adopt comprehensive cannabis legalization 
may be prudent in light of the current state of cannabis science. However, 
changing public opinion has forced the issue. In states with a ballot initiative 
process, legalization advocates will bring their case directly to voters, and 
they are very likely to succeed. In states where this process is not available, 
there is a separate but related risk. As state cannabis markets around the 
 
412 Pub. Health Law Ctr., “Master Settlement Agreement” (2019), 
https://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation/master-
settlement-agreement. Prior to the Master Settlement Agreement, in which major tobacco 
companies agreed to accept various restrictions on their business practices, the Federal Trade 
Commission had also filed a complaint alleging that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s “Joe 
Camel” campaign, featuring an anthropomorphic camel cartoon character, violated federal 
law by targeting children and adolescents. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Joe 
Camel Advertising Campaign Violates Federal Law, FTC Says (May 28, 1997), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1997/05/joe-camel-advertising-campaign-
violates-federal-law-ftc-says. 
413 Press Release, Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, As 
U.S. Celebrates 25 Years of Smoke-Free Airlines, It’s Time to Make All Workplaces and 
Public Places Smoke-Free  (Feb. 23, 2015), available at 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/2015_02_23_planes.  
414 See generally Peggy A. Lopipero & Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Interests or the Public 
Interest: 20 Years of Industry Strategies to Undermine Airline Smoking Restrictions, 15 
TOBACCO CONTROL 323 (2006). 
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country (and in other countries) mature and larger corporate entities enter415 
or emerge,416 the ability of the nascent legal cannabis industry to influence 
lawmakers will grow. The borders of legalizing jurisdictions will not contain 
this influence. If the cannabis industry gains sway in state legislatures (or 
Congress), policy will likely favor industry interests at the expense of public 
health. To protect public health, the best approach is to enshrine a public 
health approach in legalization from the outset, rather than to fight these 
battles defensively. 
 
D.  The Stakes for Public Health are High 
 
The cannabis industry is not, at present, comparable to either the tobacco 
or alcohol industries. However, both tobacco and alcohol companies, among 
others, have begun to obtain or at least explore entry into the cannabis 
market.417 These efforts have, to date, been fairly small in relation to the size 
and positioning of the industries as a whole, likely due to continuing illegality 
in most countries, including the U.S. at the federal level, and are likely to 
change as legalization progresses.  
 
Many public health best practices developed post hoc to address the 
malfeasance of powerful global industries (e.g., tobacco) that engaged in 
copious and well-documented bad behavior. As of now, that description does 
not apply to the cannabis industry. One may argue that policies designed to 
curtail the past abuses of one industry and prevent repetition are not 
necessarily applicable to an industry that has yet to engage in such abuses. 
However, a key lesson from the history of tobacco and alcohol control is that 
once industries achieve prominence and power, controlling their behavior 
becomes exponentially more difficult. In regulating cannabis, the opportunity 
exists to structure legal frameworks to create guardrails that prevent or 
minimalize damaging industry behavior, rather than ameliorate its effects 
after the fact.  
 
The state of evidence regarding the health harms of cannabis is far from 
ideal. While cannabis shares some effects with alcohol and some routes of 
 
415 See Gelles, supra note 15 (discussing corporate entries in Canadian cannabis market); 
Barry, et al., supra note 16 (presenting evidence of longstanding tobacco industry influence 
in legal cannabis market). 
416 See Debra Borchardt, The Cannabis Industry's Top 12 U.S. Multi-State Operators, 
GREEN MARKET REPORT (2019), available at https://www.greenmarketreport.com/the-
cannabis-industrys-top-12-u-s-multi-state-operators/ (compiling license and valuation data 
for largest multi-state cannabis operations).  
417 Candice M. Bowling, et al., At the Turning Point: Public Health and Medicine’s 
Response to Cannabis Commercialization (____) (under review). 
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administration with tobacco, the three are separate and distinct substances 
with unique characteristics. For example, tobacco, in all forms, is known to 
be carcinogenic. Cannabis smoke is thought to have similar effects because 
the two forms of smoke are nearly identical, save for the presence or absence 
of nicotine and cannabinoids.418 However, while existing evidence is strongly 
suggestive, carcinogenicity of cannabis has yet to be conclusively 
demonstrated,419 and non-smoked forms of cannabis (e.g., edibles) may not 
share this health risk. Yet carcinogenicity is not the only harm tobacco smoke 
poses. Smoking causes myriad other negative health impacts, particularly on 
the cardiovascular and respiratory systems, and there is evidence that 
cannabis smoke has a similar risk profile,420 which is to be expected given 
their similarity of composition.  Several other potential negative health 
effects associated with cannabis use (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, pediatric 
overdose injuries, impaired cognition, development of schizophrenia or other 
psychoses, abuse of other substances)421 are likely unrelated to mode of use. 
 
The comparative absence of evidence on cannabis’s potential health 
harms as compared to those of tobacco and alcohol may simply be the product 
of the overall dearth of research on cannabis, largely due to legal restrictions 
in place for the past several decades. The most comprehensive summary of 
the possible health effects of cannabis, both positive and negative, comes 
from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine.422 While 
that report does draw important substantive conclusions,423 its major 
recommendations all address the need for additional research.424 
Additionally, the report notes that all cannabis provided to investigators in 
the U.S. comes from the National Institutes on Drug Abuse, which sources 
 
418 TOMAR, ET AL., supra note 354; Moir, et al., supra note 84. 
419 Cannabis smoke (as “marijuana smoke”) does appear on California’s Proposition 65 
list of chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity based on an 
extensive review of existing evidence. CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEMICALS 
KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY (2019), available at 
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/proposition-65/p65single01272017.pdf; see 
generally TOMAR, ET AL., supra note 354. However, the National Academies, using different 
inclusion criteria, found moderate evidence of no association between cannabis smoking and 
incidence of lung, head, or neck cancers, only limited evidence of association between 
current, frequent, or chronic cannabis smoking and a subtype of testicular cancer, and 
insufficient evidence to support or refute association between cannabis smoking and several 
other cancers. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 141–58. 
420 Wang, et al., supra note 354. 
421 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 17–21. Of note, not all such 
associations are necessarily causal in nature. 
422 Id.  
423 Id. at 13–22. 
424 Id. at 9–12. 
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cannabis solely from a single site at the University of Mississippi and does 
not commonly provide forms of cannabis products other than standard dried 
flower (i.e., no edibles, concentrates, etc.).425 As a result, the absence of clear 
evidence of health harms from non-smoked cannabis products may be due to 
the absence of research, rather than the absence of effects in reality. Cannabis 
available for research also often fails to reflect the strains, potency, or other 
characteristics of products available on the market (licit or illicit),426 again 
indicating that absence of evidence for any particular effect or association 
should not be understood to be evidence of absence. The impacts of cannabis 
use will become clearer with time and additional research, but responsible 
regulation of cannabis cannot wait. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the long history of human cannabis use, evidence of potential 
health harms from the substance is still developing, though there is already 
more than enough to be cause for concern. Nevertheless, the failures of the 
War on Drugs and the potential societal benefits of legalization have 
contributed to strong policy momentum in favor of adult use cannabis 
legalization. To date, legalization has primarily arisen from ballot initiatives, 
but legislatures are better situated to craft legalization frameworks that 
protect public health, and many state legislative proposals to legalize 
cannabis contain public health best practice elements absent from existing 
adult use frameworks. 
 
Absent legislative action, legalization advocates will continue to use 
ballot initiatives to achieve their policy goals, and the nascent legal cannabis 
industry will continue to cultivate legislative influence. Once industry-
friendly policies become entrenched in law, they will be difficult to change. 
Legislatures should proactively adopt legalization measures to preempt 
weaker advocate-driven initiatives and future industry-influenced legislation. 
Legislative legalization may not be ideal based on the state of existing 
evidence, but it is the best available path forward in a situation where the 
status quo is demonstrably harmful and the other path potentially allows the 
repetition of past mistakes in tobacco and alcohol regulation. Legalization 
carries both opportunities and risks for public health, but inaction is not a 
viable option. 
 
* * * 
 
 
425 Id. at 382–83. 
426 Id.  
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APPENDIX 
 
We developed a set of active proposed legislation using WestLaw in 
February 2019 with the following search string: advanced: (marijuana 
marihuana cannabis) /50 ("adult use" "personal use" recreational legalize 
legalization). We limited results to past 12 months and excluded jurisdictions 
with existing adult use laws (Alaska, California, Colorado, District of 
Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington). 
 
This search yielded 234 results. We then rejected duplicates and those that 
did not address any form of legalization or only modified an existing program 
based on review of available summary or abstract, yielding 93 results. 
Application of inclusion criteria yielded a final set of 52 bills in 18 states for 
full review, as presented in Table A1, below. In July 2019, we revised the 
analysis to include Illinois’s successful H.B. 1438 as enacted. We did not 
include revised or amended versions of other (unsuccessful) bills in this 
update. 
 
Table A1: List of Reviewed Legislation 
State Year Bill # 
Arizona 2019 S.C. Res. 1022 
Connecticut 2018 H.B. 5458 
Connecticut 2019 H.B. 5595 
Connecticut 2019 H.B. 6863 
Connecticut 2018 S.B. 487 
Connecticut 2019 S.B. 496 
Connecticut 2019 S.B. 744 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 1515 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 1581 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 291 
Hawaii 2019 S.B. 442 
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Hawaii 2019 H.B. 708 
Hawaii 2019 S.B. 686 
Illinois 2019 H.B. 2477 
Illinois 2019 H.B. 902 
Illinois 2019 H.B. 1438 [enacted] 
Indiana 2019 H.B. 1685 
Kentucky 2019 S.B. 80 
Maryland 2019 H.B. 632 
Minnesota 2019 H.F. 265 
Minnesota 2019 H.F. 420 
Minnesota 2017 H.F. 4541 
Minnesota 2019 H.F. 465 
Minnesota 2019 S.F. 619 
Mississippi 2019 S.B. 2349 
Missouri 2019 H.B. 157 
Missouri 2019 H.B 551 
New Hampshire 2019 H.B. 481 
New Hampshire 2019 H.B. 722 
New Jersey 2018 A.B. 3581 
New Jersey 2018 A.B. 3819 
New Jersey 2018 A.B. 4497 
New Jersey 2018 S.B. 2702 
New Jersey 2018 S.B. 2703 
New Mexico 2019 H.B. 356 
New Mexico 2019 S.B. 577 
New York 2019 A.B. 1617 
New York 2019 A.B. 2009 
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New York 2017 A.B. 3506 
New York 2019 S.B. 1509 
New York 2019 S.B. 1527 
New York 2017 S.B. 3040 
Rhode Island 2017 S.B. 2895 
Vermont 2019 H.B. 196 
Vermont 2019 H.B. 250 
Vermont 2019 S.B. 54 
Virginia 2018 H.B. 2371 
Virginia 2018 H.B. 2373 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 2331 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 2376 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 3108 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 3129 
 
